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The Attack is the primary focus of all PLA doctrine. Defence is viewed as a holding action until the proper resources is brought to bear for further attacks. Three forms of Attack is recognized:

The Meeting Engagement is an encounter between two opposing forces on the move. The PLA views this as encountering a retreating hostile force while they are on the attack. The PLA force is expected to perform according to well-practised drills and Standard Operating Procedures. This is a reactive close quarter combat situation and the PLA believes the faster reacting commander wins the engagement. The PLA force can be expected to engage without pause or delay for planning or assessment purposes. The PLA strongly believes that this type of engagement is most common at the regimental level and below.

The Hasty Attack is when an attacking PLA force comes upon an unexpected hostile static defence. The PLA commander is expected to immediately deploy his troops in the most advantageous position possible to launch an attack with minimal delay and minimal planning.

The Deliberate Attack is often used when the Hasty Attack fails. Careful planning and proper distribution of forces and resources characterize this Attack. Most often, artillery is employed to soften up the defence before PLA units attack.

For the regimental, battalion, and company commander, command expectations are not high since the Meeting Engagement is prevalent. The only time careful planning occurs is for the PLA force to mass overwhelming force in the Deliberate Attack. In the West, the Hasty Attack is the norm for small unit action. However, the PLA lacks the support mechanism, namely a strong Non-Commissioned Officer Corp, to perform the Hasty Attack effectively. A Western officer can expect his sub-ordinates to make decisions in support of his overall plan. Since PLA officers are expected to react for the most part, such decision-making processes are lacking in resources and training.

This philosophy has allowed the PLA to field infantry very apt at the traditional infantry skills. Since the regular soldier can expect his officer to engage him without planning and assessment, he must overcome his own personal opposition by his own personal skill level. The regular soldier cannot expect his officer to maneuver reserves for support

This system also bypasses certain PLA weaknesses, namely the lack of a good C4I infrastructure. The units are given orders beforehand and can expect no last minute deviation, thus avoiding the need for a strong tactical communication net.

While the West may be able to field superior units, they are also saddled with operational complexities that the PLA general does not have. The PLA infantry are expected to fight as-is and not requiring any further support from engineer, artillery, or armour assets. A Western general has to prioritize when and how his front line units get the required support.