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Despite the PRC's non-interference policy, since the end of WWII, more Chinese soldiers have died on foreign soil than Russia, France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) combined. These casualties are mainly suffered during two wars, the Korean War (1950-1953) and the First Sino-Vietnam War (1979). Despite Chinese claims of brilliant strategic performances, the high casualty rates suggest severe tactical failings.

China's entry into Korea on Oct 19, 1950 marked one of the highlights in PLA history. The Chinese managed to field the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies largely undetected and laid a trap for the US/UN forces. The People's Volunteer Army (PVA) managed to destroy several elements of the South Korean army as well as inflicted large damages on several international brigades. Yet, the operational requirements were far more ambitious. They meant to destroy the American 8th Army and the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF).

Combat operations commenced on 25 October 1950. In a series of brilliant covert placements, the PVA managed to capture Unson on 2 November at a cost of around 10,000 casualties. However, significant American and United Nations (UN) Forces, the South Korean 8th Division and the US 24th Infantry Division escaped the traps.

On 25 Nov, the PVA began their ambitious campaigns by surrounding both the 8th Army and the 1st MEF. The PVA's 113th Division captured Samso-ri on 28 Nov, cutting the UN's retreat to Sunchon while the Marines were surrounded at Choisin. Neither action was successful in containing the American forces. The 8th Army broke through and regrouped south of the 38th Parallel and the Marines escaped via sealift.

The PVA clearly failed in their operational objectives but the fact that the 8th Army ran from North Korea allowed the PVA to claim of having destroyed all US/UN forces in North Korea.

In complete contrast, no amount of strategic propaganda can cover the tactical failures of the Sino-Vietnam War. The campaign was racked by mistakes ranging from training and preparation to using a Red Army meatgrinder tactic that the PLA had neither the training, the resources nor the experience to perform.

The problems arisen from the training should have stopped the campaign but no senior officer put a stop to an overly ambitious plan. The lack of proper maps and compasses resulted in troops getting lost during training. Radio waves wrapped themselves silly around the hilly terrain. Operations Officers did not have the training or experience to properly equip their troops resulting in units went without water for 24 to 48 hours after first contact. The terrain hampered effective artillery fire, forcing the PLA to rely on manpower for their meatgrinder tactics. The element of surprise had been lost. The Vietnamese battle hardened militia were well dug in and waiting. In contrast, the PLA mobilized second class garrison troops. The PLA's best-armed and best-trained troops faced a Northern possible much tougher Soviet retaliation.

None of these deficiencies were addressed before the PLA attacked on 17 February 1979. The PLA attacked Vietnam through 26 points of entry. Immediately, the sheer volume of battle management overwhelmed the PLA's limited C3. The front line units were experiencing human and equipment casualties that cannot sustain battle momentum. Moreover, company commanders would rather wait for tank and recoilless rifle support before taking on Vietnamese entrenched positions.

The front line units exhausted themselves, forcing a re-supply much earlier than planned. Re-enforcement and re-supply were brought forward to shore up the units. The 26 unwieldy prongs were consolidated into a more manageable 9 aiming at Cao Bang, Lang Son, Hang Lien Sen, Lai Chou and Quang Ninh.

The final phase saw the heaviest fighting of the war, climaxing with the capture of Lang Son on 2 March. The Vietnamese adopted their favourite tactics of abandoning urban areas in favour of the built up surrounding hills. The PLA did not contest these strong points. Instead, they pushed through to the urban areas, taking them after fierce close quarter combat. None of the routes into these urban areas were what we in the West would consider secured.

In the final analysis, it was the bellycrawler who accomplished the mission instead of the star-studded staff.