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Amphibious Warfare Capabilities of the People's Liberation Army:
An Assessment on Recent Modernizations[1]

The 1996 military exercises clearly displayed logistics as one of the ad hoc War Zone command’s main shortcomings. There was a lack of a centralized command system that could mobilize and coordinate both the civilian and military resources. Unlike the cold war days, where PLA controlled the civilian economy, today the training and coordination between the civilian and the military disappeared during Deng’s economic reforms.

In 1998 the PLA created the Joint Logistic Department at each military level, working closely with the State National Defense Mobilization Committee (NDMC) to address the logistic needs in future wars. The NDMC is a state council organ, and thus has direct control over civilian provincial authorities. It is also noted that in the past, the Minister of National Defense also served as the head of the NDMC, in addition to the position of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission [16]. In 2003, during the third plenary session, General Cao Gangchuan (head of the NDMC) called for the intensification of organization and leadership within the NDMC for military preparation [17], and for Logistic Command Headquarters to be set up in a manner similar to that of people’s armament department at each region in accordance with strategic planning of the central authorities [18].

As PLA publications [19] have stated: the immense destructive power of high tech weaponry requires an enormous amount of material with a rapid consumption rate. Therefore logistic support should not be limited to one direction, one arm of the military force, or one War Zone. While the war might be regional, logistic support is not. If logistical support for troops is to be sustained continuously after sufficient self-protection is ensured, the logistic department must rely on existing logistical resources within the region to build up an indestructible network basis for guaranteeing wartime logistic supplies [20]. In additional to civilian resources, large logistical depots are being built in the coastal region for both common supplies and specialized equipments for all arms of the services.

However, as those papers continue to note, national mobilization should address economic development first, as a higher level of mobilization and resources will only be available under a well-developed economy [21].

Another PLA paper argued that civilian vessels during the first phase of the cross-strait amphibious landing operations will cause difficulty, in addition into dangers at sea for lack of protection therefore more plausible strategy is to divide operation into different stage with different emphasis, prioritize the key factors, grasp the right moment, and combine the military with civilian resource [22]. The first stage of the island landing operation requires logistic cover be timely, accurate and highly efficient with focus on using military asset to provide support such as helicopters and high speed crafts, while the middle and last phase should concentrate on mobilization vast number of civilian ships, for example, civilian container ships will be converted as ad hoc helicopter carrier. [23] Sea and Air covers should apply to all logistic assets suggested by the same PLA paper, those asset including airports, harbors, command centers, telecommunications systems, warehouse and weapon factories [24], while PLA can hit assets across the strait, the same can be apply from the other side.

After PLA’s LST launched the first wave, it will be up to 4 to 5 hours before reinforcement can be ferry in as the 2nd wave by the same LST, therefore, it is an ultra important mission that PLA amphibious force capture a sea port in a timely manor.