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Amphibious Warfare Capabilities of the People's Liberation Army:
An Assessment on Recent Modernizations[1]

In published reports and photos of the 1996 exercise, the PLA assault did not command much in terms of direct and indirect fire support. The only direct fire support was from light tank guns and light to medium size AAA guns mounted on the LSTs where they disembarked from. This is in sharp contrast to the amphibious landings conducted during World War II where NGS would often made impressive bombardments. Landing craft were also accompanied by Landing Craft Support (LCS) armed with hundreds, even thousands, of rockets. The PLAN’s LSTs are only armed with twin 40 round launchers of 122mm rockets.

Rockets are considered to be the solution for organic fire support for the landing craft because they impart no recoil to a ship’s deck, thus they could be fired on top of lightly built craft. They offer enormous, if inaccurate and short lived, firepower. Perhaps the strongest lesson of Dieppe was that enemy defenders had to be stunned or suppressed as the assault reaches the beach. The PLAN did experiment with Yunnan class Rocket Fire LCS concept, however, there is no evidence it was put into production.

A PLA landing force cannot expect much NGS from major PLAN surface combatants such as Destroyers (DDG) and Frigates (FFG) for two reasons: any amphibious force requires an escort screen, especially when a fleet is made up by slow moving STUFT and other low defensive capability ships. A layered defensive measure would require modern submarines, PTG (Fast Attack Craft – Missile) and long range fighter recon at the outer layer, long range missiles and strike fighter bombers at the second layer, and DDG and FFG at the core to protect the fleet. Considering the operations required in a Taiwan invasion scenario, DDG and FFG would be on battle stations at all time to ensure continuous supply and reinforcement across the strait and guard against counter-attacks from the ROCN. Secondly, they are also valuable targets that can easily fall prey to coastal Anti-Ship Missile sites and may be put at risk by operating close to shore for NGS missions.

While the PLAN’s NGS support is limited, other navies are moving away from the need for massive NGS in an amphibious operations. During WWII, NGS consistently proved unable to destroy well-sited defenses, particularly if they were constructed from reinforced concrete. The massive bombardment had to be halted when assaulting troops close in the beach. This pause generally allowed the defender to regroup and man their formal posts. Thus a percentage of landing craft were converted to fire support ships to allow continuous NGS close to the landing troops during the entire amphibious operation. However, the increased range, accuracy and lethality of Precision-Guide Munitions (PGM) had largest eliminated the role of dedicated landing fire support ships. Today, few navies have landing fire support ships in service. The last US navy fire support ship that saw action was the USS Carronade during Vietnam War. Interesting, Chinese media and photos have suggested that older Jianghu class FFG are being modified as a destroyer transport (APD) for both NGS and transport. It is clear that numbers of Jianghu FFG are being refitted in Shanghai, but so far there is no solid confirmation on their future role.

The concept of APD is another lesson from the WWII as the US converted number of old DD into destroyer transports and used them in amphibious operations. The first one was the USS Manley, converted in Staten island about Dec 1938 into an APD (destroyer transport). During a test, another APD, Jacob Jones (ex-DD 130), was able to carry 100 full armed troops (WWII style) successfully. The testing board estimated that an APD could carry up to 200 men for up to 24 hours without excessive troop fatigue, in addition to providing NGS. As a frigate, the Jianghu class is over twice the size of a WWII destroyer. WWII APDs were fast, with low freeboard, and able to land at the beach. In 1942, a typical APD accommodated 148 marines and 25 tons of cargo. The US continued the program well into 1945, including converting the USS Kane APD18 in 1945. The last converted APD was DD Chaumont. The Japanese picked up this idea with their Shinshu Maru program.

While the PLA is one of world’s leading experts in artillery rocketry, its troops cannot rely on their long-range rockets fired from opposite side of the strait for indirect support in a tactical situation: The M9 and M11 Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) are too valuable to be used as tactical support weapons. Even if the estimate of 450 is indeed correct; they will focus on larger targets.

The cheaper WS-1B rockets have no mid-course correction capability. With a 180 km range, a very good uncorrected fin-and-spin stabilized MRL will scatter half of its rockets in an ellipse 4500 meters long and about 1500 meters wide, with the other 50% outside that ellipse.

The other PLA long-rang MRL system, the A-100, does have course correction capability, however it is too small in numbers and its range is too short to have any impact on amphibious operation within the next 5 years.

The PLA ground forces have never enjoyed close air support from the Air Force, and they will not expect to do so in near future. From all indication, the PLAAF’s exercises in the coastal regions have been separated from the ground force's. There is yet a PLAAF ground control assigned to ground units. The only warplane the PLAAF has capable of being a long-range striker is equipped with weapons design for interdiction missions rather than close air support. PLAAF’s primary mission is creating an air umbrella for a safe passage from the ROCAF’s ground attackers.