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Amphibious Warfare Capabilities of the People's Liberation Army:
An Assessment on Recent Modernizations[1]

While the PLA continued to improve the complexity of their amphibious operations by including air and naval elements and with modified equipment, strategy and more careful planning, their basic tactics remained the same: a massive infantry rush toward the beach from their small landing craft or motor boats, a scene reminiscent of the human wave tactics of the Korean War. Some of the finer points of the light infantry tactical art, such as small arms fix and maneuver assault, could not be applied due to the limited space on a beachhead. Once landed after a long journey, PLA infantry expected no long-range direct fire support. Their artillery would continue to fire at predetermined targets rather than Time of Target (TOT) and other advanced bombardment methods. Although PLA troops are physically fit and capable of making enormous sacrifices, they will unquestionably suffer a great deal of causalities. A PLA amphibious assault would be massive in scale but of small craft, including hundreds of small wooden fishing motor boats, with the goal of overwhelming the defender, as they would not able to sink them all as the case of Hainan invasion. On the other hand, small fishing boat will tend to inflict seasickness during the passages, decreasing combat performance of the troops when they land.

Due to the limitations of their transport, PLA infantry assault parties also have to carry crew-serviced weapons and engineering equipment with them, such as heavy machine guns, satchel charges and flamethrowers. In other words, they also have to act as their own combat engineers, as heavy equipment will not be available in a long while.

The PLA shifted its focus after the end of the Cold War away from stopping an all-out invasion by the Soviet Union to that of a high-tech combat crossing of the Taiwan Strait. The PLA suffered a great deal of lost expertise during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and had to relearn amphibious warfare from where they left it in the 1950s. Today, the PLA faces a totally different type of operational requirement in their Taiwan invasion preparation. In addition, Taiwanese defenders are vastly different from that of yesteryear’s KMT conscripts, and with all the space sensors operating above the sky, it is very questionable that the PLA can count on any element of surprise in an attack against the main island of Taiwan. Thus, a new complex of tactics is needed for not only an amphibious operation, but the entire armed forces as well.

One of the first changes that took place was the increased number of LSTs entering service since the 1980s. This change was to address the tactical shortcomings of a massive infantry attack pounding the beach at the same time, making good targets for the defenders. While the first PLA Yukan Class LST was commissioned in 1980, by 1997 only 7 had entered service. However, the tempo of construction has increased dramatically in recent years, with 9 additional LST under various degrees of construction. As the PLA moved from a light infantry force to a mechanized one, they can begin to take full advantage of what LSTs can offer. PLA LSTs can debark both Amphibious Light Tanks (ALT) and Amphibious Armored Personal Carriers (AAPC) out of both the stern and the bow gates a mile off shore instead of disembarking them right at the beach . This allows the larger vessels to remain at some distance from enemy fire. ALTs and AAPCs offer mobility, firepower and some degree of protections for the troops inside. They also greatly reduce seasickness for the troops. All PLAN LSTs can flood their stern gates and allow light air-cushion vehicles to sail directly into the sea as well. PLAN LSTs also have helicopters platforms for 2 medium Z-8 choppers, which can be used to resupply troops, offer limited vertical insertion capabilities, and can evacuate the wounded.

The LST is a great improvement over older amphibious ships such as the AP (Assault Personnel) and STUFT (Ships Taken Up From Trade), i.e. civilian freighter and cargo ships, in which infantry have to unload into the very small WWII style of Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) or Landing Craft Utility (LCU). Before the assault begins, LCVP and LCU are required to move into a designated assembly area where they form into assault waves before their pre-arranged approach to the shore. This is a time consuming, dangerous process and requires massive NGS to suppress the defenders from targeting the assembly area. The PLA swimming vehicles of ALT and AAPC types can fine tune their approach and cut down the requirement for a long stay at a designated assembly point, or even eliminate the need for an assembly point altogether.

With increased capability to swim, the LST can release the swimmers away from the coastal line, and reduce time for a round trip journey, thus enabling a more rapid reinforcement and re-supply rate for the troops up front. In accordance with hard lessons learned from many amphibious operations conducted elsewhere such as Dieppe and Omaha Beach, the tempo of an amphibious operation must be high and the first echelon cannot be pinned down on the beach. Reinforcements must be able to rush in and be placed in immediate action despite initial causalities.