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Amphibious Warfare Capabilities of the People's Liberation Army:
An Assessment on Recent Modernizations[1]

The Hainan campaign that followed was much larger than the failed Jinman landing. China’s second largest island was defended by five KMT armies, including 19 divisions plus one Special Operation group; the Naval 3rd Fleet with one marine regiment; and the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 20th Fighter Squadrons. In sum, a total of 100,000 men, 50 warships and 42 aircrafts of various types were available.

From the PLA side, Veterans of the 4th Field Army were assigned the Hainan after their successful conclusion of the Guangxi campaign. In preparation for the invasion, the 15th Army (who would later gain fame during the Korean War and become the base of PLA’s 15th airborne army) general staff would take charge of the entire operation, including the command of 43rd and 40th Armies, the 28th howitzer regiment, the 1st and 9th AAA regiments, and other support elements to a sum of 100,000 men. They moved into Leizhou peninsula’s staging area in February, 1950.

As a result of lessons learned in Jinman, the PLA shipped battalion size operatives with radios into Hainan island during March of 1950 to gather intelligence. Close to ten thousand troops from both the 40th and 43rd armies also conducted 4 amphibious landing exercises in two waves as preparation for the real operation.

The PLA also adopted a new strategy during invasion of Hainan Island in April 16, 1950; while they continued to conscripted civilian ships to transport the troops, they modified 32 of them into motorized gunboats by shielding them with sandbags and arming them with light artillery. To gain an element of surprise, the cross strait operation was conducted at night, and it was also backed by artillery and air cover, which were lacking during Jinman. The night operation caught the KMT defenders totally by surprise, and only four warships of KMT’s 3rd fleet were located in the strait to engage this massive force. While they sank many of the PLA gunboats, they were not able to inflict damage to the troop transports, as modified gunboats actively engaged KMT warships with their better maneuverability and kept them distracted from attacking the main transports. Of those four KMT warships, one was sunk and two others were damaged during the course of action.

The PLA first wave composed of 8 regiments from the 40th and 43rd armies with Han Xian as the operational command. The 20,000 strong force boarded 380 conscripted civilian ships. They debarked at 19:30 and by 0300 the majority of the fleet was landed at their pre-designated spot cross the Qiongzhou Strait (Hainan Strait) even under heavy fog and low temperature. The defending KMT troops were unable to interdict the PLA force once they landed with a number of divisional level counter attacks . The 40th army reached its primary objective of controlling the high ground of Jialai and Lingao by the 19th of April, while the 43rd also took Port of Yubao as planned.

While the first wave continued to enjoy freedom of action in their search and destroy mission, the PLA’s 2nd wave of 5 regiments landed west of Haikou and began trapping the defenders. The campaign ended by May 1st, when the last of the 3500 KMT defenders surrendered. The capture of the second largest island held by the KMT cost the PLA heavy losses, but more then 90,000 KMT troops were captured as the campaign ended very quickly. This victory resulted from careful planning followed by neutralization of the KMT ground, naval, and air forces. Shore based artillery was employed to gain effective control of the sea and airspace between Hainan and the mainland, and Taiwan’s senior commanders performed poorly. [4]