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Amphibious Warfare Capabilities of the People's Liberation Army:
An Assessment on Recent Modernizations[1]

Jinman island is only 10 km away from the mainland at its closest point, and its total size of the twin island is about 124 Sq km. The Jinman operation of 1949 was coined by the PLA as one of this worst defeats in her history.

The KMT ad hoc 22nd Army Group commanded by Li Liangwang was in charge of Jinman defense. In the East of the main island, it was commanded by Gao Kuiyuan with 11th division, 18th army, and 45th division, 25th Army. In the West, it was commanded by Chen Xiangkui with 201st division and a greatly under-strength 40th divisions of the 25th army. The smaller Jinman’s defense was commanded by Li Yunchen 200th division; the 33rd regiment, 11th division, 18th army; some left over from the destroyed 166th division and 118th divisions of the 18th army; plus two armored battalions and some other under-strength support elements. The fortification process started in August 1949. By October, the beaches were laid with 7000 land mines and 800 water mines in addition to large number of obstacles.

As for the PLA, the job of assaulting the twin islands by amphibious means was assigned to the PLA's 28th army of the 10th army group. The 28th army’s deputy commander Xiao Fang and Political Commissioner Li Mancun manned the frontline command post. Its Order of Battle (Orbat) for the Jinman operation included six regiments, including: the 82nd division, the 251st regiment of the 84th division, 253rd regiment, 85th division, and the 259th regiment, 87th division of the 29th army.

The operation soon encountered some serious obstacles; first, the PLA 28th army was faced with serious shortage of transport as fishing and cargo ships had either been sunk or conscripted by the fleeing KMT force. After 20 days of searching they managed to secure little more than 100 boats, clearly not enough for the entire force of six regiments. The invasion plan was postponed for another 23 days before enough ships could be conscripted, with most of them coming from inland. The element of surprise was clearly lost.

The PLA boarded their civilian fishing and cargo ships at 0900 on October 24, but it wasn't until 1800 before the force were completely assembled. In the meanwhile, they were under constant attack by the KMT air force. Additional obstacles soon developed after they set sail, as strong winds started to break the assault group into three parties. Many other boats became lost because many conscripted crews were from the inland area and not familiar with local waters. To make matters worse there were no communications between command and the ships, and organization was completely lost. Each ship was on its own.

The 244th regiment was the first unit to land, completely off course; its three battalions were not able to find each other . The 251st regiment also landed soon afterward, with 1/3 of its ships already sunk, many of them carrying ammunition for the entire regiment.

At the beach, there were no organizations as chain of command completely broke down. Every man was fighting for himself. The remaining force somehow managed to take control of some fortifications and hold out until the 27th before being wiped out. All six of the PLA regimental commanders were either killed in action or committed suicide.

On November 7, the PLA’s 7th Army made a similar landing at Dengbu and was similarly routed, losing 5000 to 7000 additional troops. [2]

The PLA Daily [3] summarized the failure of the Jinman landing battle as follows:

First, lack of preparation; there was the shortage of ships, and these were manned by conscripts instead of experienced sailors. There was no communication between ships or from ship to shore. One result of this was a lack of firepower, as the force was supported by eighty 75mm and 105mm howitzers from shore, but there were no communication channels established to enable effective fire support.

Second, lack of intelligence; sailors were not familiar with local waters, there were no reliable weather reports, and there was no information on suitable landing spot or the defenders' deployment.

The 9000 men of the attacking 10th Army were wiped out after landings on Jinmen, trapped as their transports were quickly sunk; the attackers stood no chance as they had neither artillery nor air support.