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Since 1997, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has mechanized a large number of its infantry units. Some have noted this as an indication of a new doctrine, while others see it as an unnecessary waste of resources. However, if we view the role of mechanized infantry in a historical perspective, the current mechanization effort started in the late 1990s might not seem so radical, but rather a continuation of the PLA's past policies.

For the PLA, the difference between Mechanized Infantry and Motorized Infantry is not only confined to the equipment, but in their tactical roles. The definition of Infantry and Mechanized Infantry Warfare, according to “China People's Liberation Army Military Terms,” is as follows: Infantry rides to the battlefield by motorized vehicle and Armored Infantry Carrier (APC), whereas Mechanized Infantry rides in Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV). Infantry is equipped with small caliber weapons and operates in a small front; they dismount from their vehicles before engaging in combat with support from artillery, tanks and other equipment attached from higher echelons. Mechanized Infantry, on the other hand, operates side by side with armor and other arms, and can utilize an array of weapons on board the IFV such as cannons, howitzers, mortars, Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), and grenade launchers. For mechanized infantry, their rifle serves as a secondary weapon. Furthermore, the Handbook for PLA Commander states that, under ordinary circumstances, the main mission of the IFV is combat, the transportation of personnel and weapons being secondary. Mechanized infantry go to battle mostly in vehicles and on foot secondarily and due to the need to cooperate with other arms such as tanks and Self Propelled Artillery. The communication system available for mechanized infantry is more complex. The PLA views the command structure of the infantry as more pyramid-like whereas Mechanized Infantry is more network-like, and has a much more flexible deployment and tactical mobility. Cost is one of the major drawbacks of a mechanized infantry unit compared to an infantry unit, and its troops also require a more lengthy period of training.

While most armies were mechanized during World War II, due to number of factors the PLA simply could not afford to mechanize their entire army, and that is the case even today. Historically, they mechanized a very limited number of units and took advantage of their firepower, mobility and deployment to act as “fist” units for contingences according to their doctrine requirements.

The primary doctrine of the PLA from its founding up to the 1970s was the People's War doctrine, in which it called for large number of light infantry supported by the population to conduct an all-out protracted war against the super powers. However, at the same time it retained a small portion of troops to perform specified tasks. The 1962 war with India was a good example of how the PLA used a small but well-prepared number of troops to perform a limited action for a short period of time within the framework of People's War.

One of the major concerns of the PLA planners after the Korean War was the possibility of an amphibious landing by the US military near in Tianjing by the Yellow Sea. If Tianjing were to fall to such an attack, Beijing would be only 100 KM away over flat terrain. It was the same route the “Allied” relief force took during the Boxer Rebellion. The first PLA mechanized infantry unit was formed with the above requirement in mind, also as an experimental unit for combined arms warfare after the PLA light infantry suffered a horrifying casualty rate during the Korean War.