www.China-Defense.com

PLA’s Latest Experiment With Mobility and Fire Power:
A Look at the Special (Experimental) Light Mechanized Infantry Regiment,
13th Group Army, Chengdu Military Region

The LMIC, HMIC, and FSC collectively constitute the maneuver punch of the LMR, but their individual methods of operational employment differ greatly. The HMIC and FSC represent the armored fist and light cavalry of classical warfare, but the specialized air assault credentials of the LMIC merit an in-depth examination.

The light mechanized infantry squad’s 8x8 ATV and 4x4 ATV will fit in the Mi-17 HIP, a medium lift helicopter nearly ubiquitous in PLA LH service. Once out of the helicopter it only takes a few seconds to mount a crew-served weapon on the 8x8 ATV. Compared to externally slinging vehicles, this ability to internally load two combat vehicles provides greatly increased tactical flexibility when performing air assault operations. Pickup, insertion, and extraction of forces are greatly expedited. There is no requirement to carry slings on a mission, no specialized slingload training required for the troops, and no time spent combat ineffective while the vehicles are rigged for slinging. Further, for the helicopters there is no airspeed reduction enroute nor maneuvering restriction at the landing zone due to carrying a pendulous slingload. All these advantages make the LMIC a superb tool for executing the lightning fast air assault raids envisioned in the new PLA joint doctrine.

While dismounted air assault forces traditionally land on their objective, the added mobility of an LMIC allows it the option of being inserted a terrain-feature away from the objective. By inserting the LMIC away from defenders instead of on top of them, the most vulnerable phase of an air assault operation is avoided. Land, unload, form up, orient leaders, and then advance toward the objective. While some surprise may be lost, the tremendous tactical mobility of the LMIC adds an element of deception as their actual objective is not obvious.

Contrasting with the airmobile agility of the LMIC is the heavy armor of the HMIC. With two platoons of infantry fighting vehicles and one of tanks, the HMIC is not a candidate for airlift by Mi-17 helicopters. Three possible scenarios have been postulated for use of the HMIC. One, following a shallow air assault insertion of an LMIC the HMIC attempts to break through and link up. Two, after the LMIC secures an airfield via air assault the HMIC is inserted on PLAAF transport aircraft to reinforce it. Three, the HMIC is a placeholder for a future capability. Of these possibilities the third appears the most plausible.

At the 2006 Farnborough International Air Show Russian helicopter manufacturer Rostvertol announced that it was opening a joint venture in China to market its Mi26T HALO heavy-lift helicopter. Should this massive aircraft make its way into PLA hands it would exponentially increase the capability of an LMR. Heavier armored vehicles of the LMR such as the ZBD97 IFV could be internally loaded in a HALO, and large vehicles such as the PTL02 assault gun could be slingloaded. The PLA is known to have developed a new light tank based on the ZBD97 chassis. If this new tank were to replace the Type 96 tank in the HMIC the entire LMR would be airmobile via Mi-26 HALO.

Employment of the LMR will certainly be a joint endeavor for the PLA. Although fighter aircraft are known to have difficulty finding and engaging low-flying helicopters, the success of the LMR will depend on the PLAAF’s ability to keep enemy fighter aircraft away from LH helicopters. Sophisticated air defense systems also have the potential to impede the mobility of the LMR. Second Artillery units may be called upon to neutralize the air defense threat. These challenges are not new to the LMR, air assault formations worldwide have developed tactics and techniques to minimize the threat poised by enemy aircraft and air defenses. The PLA will develop their own approach to countering this threat.