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PLA’s Latest Experiment With Mobility and Fire Power:
A Look at the Special (Experimental) Light Mechanized Infantry Regiment,
13th Group Army, Chengdu Military Region

Like other militaries around the world, the PLA fields experimental units to test new doctrines and equipment. The 155th Infantry Regiment, 149th Mechanized Infantry Division, 13th Group Army was designated the new Special (Experimental) Light Mechanized Infantry Regiment (LMR) in October 2005. For evaluating their new mobility-based doctrine the PLA chose a unit based in western China where rough terrain is the norm. Jungles near Vietnam, deserts of Xinjing, and the mountains of Tibet all restrict movement in the region where the 155th Regiment and its parent the 149th Division serve as the Rapid Reaction Unit.

A unit with a proud lineage, the 149th Division has a long history in the region. The 149th was credited with the destruction of the Indian 7th Brigade during the Sino-India War of 1962, and scored a victory over the 174th and 148th Regiments of the Vietnamese 316A Division during the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979 earning a unit citation. Elements of the 149th again served with distinction during the 1989 imposition of marshal law in Tibet, when the 446th Regiment was airlifted to Lhasa to reinforce the local garrison.

The 155th Infantry Regiment appears to be a good candidate to prove the concepts of the new PLA joint doctrine. For many years the 155th has operated as a Rapid Reaction Unit operating across western China. In addition, the 155th was one of first infantry units in western China to be mechanized, and the 155th was also one of the first PLA units to include an organic UAV detachment. Reorganized now as Light Mechanized Infantry, the 155th will once again lead the way for the PLA.

Within the PLA there already exist highly mobile formations that primarily employ wheeled vehicles for transport: the Motorized Infantry. According to CCTV, there are four major areas where Light Mechanized Infantry differs from Motorized Infantry, they are:

Command and control are areas where the LMR differs from other PLA infantry regiments. While regular PLA infantry regiments are commanded by Lieutenant Colonels, like a PLA Special Operations Regiment a Colonel commands the LMR. According to Central China Television (CCTV) reports, each battalion within the LMR has a large headquarters staff with PLAAF liaison officers, satellite communication equipment, UAV feeds, and the unusual authority to make all tactical decisions. A small Regimental Headquarters is for administrative and logistics purposes only. Within the LMR, tactical formations are task organized Groups instead of traditional 3-by-3 structured organizations. Groups are battalion-sized formations assembled for a specific mission, roughly equivalent to a US Army Task Force.

Communications capabilities and the use of computers within the LMR appear to be quite robust by PLA standards. At least two satellite uplinks have been observed in use within the LMR, one manpack and one vehicle mounted, but more remarkable is a voice and data capability linking individual vehicles with command posts. Reportedly most vehicles have digital connectivity with higher command posts via battle command software resident on an onboard Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) device. Digital messaging in the form of a Call-for-Fire has been demonstrated; it is unclear to what extent situational awareness reporting is automated if at all. Also unclear is the method of digital connectivity from individual vehicles to higher headquarters. Owing to the apparently lone antenna on most vehicles it is implied that data piggybacks on a tactical voice radio. Many command post vehicles have antennas associated with terrestrial-based digital radios. At least two large telescoping masts estimated to be 36-meters high have been seen to have the same “digital” antenna. At least one vehicle has also been observed with two-way low bandwidth satellite antenna similar to ones used in the commercial trucking industry. Use of hardened military laptop computers and large projected displays appeared widespread during a CCTV segment featuring an LMR command post.

The LMR is an infantryman's answer to the demands of the new PLA joint doctrine. If an infantryman is told that the important targets are the soft ones behind the lines, he wants to know how he can get there and stick them with his bayonet. In a style of warfare where “shock effect” really matters, the impact of an LMIC overrunning command nodes and logistic centers would be devastating.