PLA Ground Forces

Brigade Reform and
the Recent PLA Development

• Introduction
• The Brigades' Role in the PLA's WarZone Campaign Doctrine
• Rapid Reaction Units and Pockets Of Excellence:
• Training and Organization
• New Laws and Regulations
• The Brigades
• Table of Equipment
• Notes

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Brigade Reform and the Recent PLA Development

by Xinhui

Training and Organization:

The goal of the brigade training programs is to match the described requirement. The slogan the PLA adopted for the brigade training programs are: "one expert, many abilities; one soldier, many uses" (yi- zhuan- duo- neng-yi- bing- duo- yong, ), [36] Brigade cadres are to be retrained for their new role. They are to understand three additional arms operations, their technological requirements, and command functions of organization structures. [37] The training generally takes two years to complete, and at the end, they are expected to know how to operate a computer, be familiar with the operations of multi-media teaching equipments, understand all in-service communication equipments, know how to operation heavy weaponry, able to drive both tracked and wheeled vehicles, able to organize a small training class, and can coordinate battalion size or smaller combat units [38] All new requirements focused on communication between cadres and troops, and increase understand and coordination among different service arms, as part of the PLA's flexible "component assembly" concept. Infantries will not longer be the "big brother" (lao da ge, ) of the battlefield, other arms such as artillery, engineering, communications will also play equally important roles. The continued focus on brigade leadership is intended to increase the overall operational capability with cooperation among different arms. [39] The brigades have been given augmented weapons and arms. An artillery brigade, for example, has increased the number of types of weapons in service from three or four to more than 10 in just two years, and many cadres are foreign to the new weapons and their application. The new training programs and organizational changes have brought to light many issues. The PLA Daily has reported that the addition weapons and training requirements have placed tremendous stress on already downsized command staffs. [40] After conversion from motorized infantry division to smaller motorized infantry brigades, the soldier to cadre ratio increased from 5:1 to 9:1. As a side effect of this "down sizing", the prospects for career advancement for more the 65% of those cadres with more then 2 years of service became limited and thus, most cadres decided to resign. Competition became quite fierce for the much-reduced number of command positions within the new brigades. [41]

A recent military exercise affords the opportunity to peek at the brigades' reaction training programs. A motorized infantry brigade from the Beijing MR conducted a long-range raid to a distance of over 2000 KM in ten days, across snow covered plains of the Gobi desert. On route, it conducted anti reconnaissance techniques such as camouflage and concealment, and protection against enemy air attack [42] The exercise focused on the speedy reinforcement over a great distance while avoiding detection.