PLA Ground Forces
Brigade Reform and
the Recent PLA Development
Brigade Reform and the Recent PLA Development
by Xinhui
Rapid Reaction Units and Pockets Of Excellence : (2/2)
Traditional PLA tactics are based on two models, the offensive action and the defensive action. The nature of the offensive operation is to attack the enemy, while the nature of the defensive action is repelling enemy attacks. The objective of offensive operation is to annihilate the enemy's vital force, capture specific areas and targets, while that of defense is to foil enemy attacks, defend certain areas and targets. Offense achieved by breakthrough, encirclement, flanking maneuvers, penetration and infiltration, while defense is by positional and mobile resistance. In terms of priority, offense is primary and decisive, defense is secondary and auxiliary, in manpower, offense requires superiority, need only defense parity or even inferiority. All defensive operations are more dependent on topography. [30]
To fight a limited war, the PLA changed
their thinking on both the offensive and defensive operational models.
A new concept of "In-depth strike" was put forward. [31] In
a modern, limited war, the boundary between the two models is blurred
for several reasons. First, the introduction of modern arms such as precision-guided
munitions, and stand off weapons platforms, may provide any side with
both offensive and defensive capabilities. As a result, modern battles
may involve frequent shifting between the two postures on both sides,
and may give a phenomenon of offensive versus offensive (Duigong,
).
Secondly, the increased difficulty of static defenses sustaining three-dimensional
pressures in order to repel a highly mobile enemy reinforces the tendency
of fusing defensive action with offensive action. Finally, unit deployment
needs to be dispersed as the accuracy and destructiveness of long-range
arms improve, while may in turn increase the frequency of the encounters
with the similarly highly mobile enemy units. Battles will be fought
and resolved quickly, before the constitution of positional units. [32]
The PLA views the concept of "In-depth strike" as follows:
In conducting in-depth
strike, it is absolutely necessary "not to get entangled with
the enemy at the forward position," but rather to "avoid
the hard shell of the enemy" and to "dispense swiftly superior
operational energy to the enemy in-depth" through "camouflaged
infiltration, forced penetration, air projection, flanking intrusion,
and rear entails "high risk, adverse environment, and complex
situation" involving possible "severe hindrance or even loss
of command, communication and co-ordination," it is necessary
to combine "centralized style" command with the "delegating
style" (weituo shi,
)to "give
full play to the initiative, flexibility and creativity of lower commanders." For
force structure, it is necessary to "reinforce manpower and arms
downward" and "organize highly capable, multifunctional,
independence force groupings" to operate flexibly in the "chaotic
stalemate," and to "strike vital targets such as enemy command
and communication centers, high-tech weapon systems, and supply systems." [33]
Jia Xiaowei "In-depth Attack in Mountainous Terrains"
PLA Daily (Jiefangjun bao,
)
In short, as Godwin characterizes, the brigade's roles are like "door openers" striking at critical targets and creating a breach in the enemy's position; as a "scalpel" to strike at target that once destroyed would paralyze the adversary's combat potential; as "steel hammer" to seize crucial enemy positions; and as "boosters" to speed up tempo of a campaign by opening up new battle areas within the adversary's positions, [34] It is also noted that, in a parallel, 18 PLA Rapid Reaction Engineering units were formed to provide addition support for other arms. [35]
