PLA Ground Forces

Brigade Reform and
the Recent PLA Development

• Introduction
• The Brigades' Role in the PLA's WarZone Campaign Doctrine
• Rapid Reaction Units and Pockets Of Excellence:
• Training and Organization
• New Laws and Regulations
• The Brigades
• Table of Equipment
• Notes

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Brigade Reform and the Recent PLA Development

by Xinhui

The Brigades' role in the PLA's WarZone Campaign Doctrine:

PLA officers and Chinese publications in recent years have used the term WarZone Campaign very frequently. It is a doctrine that the PLA developed for its future wars and generally describes a strategic region where military operations is conducted during a limited war under a joint command headquarters. [8] The term WarZone Campaign is an application of the concept "Limited, Local war under High-Tech Condition". As James Mulvenon pointed out, "the phrase 'Limited, Local War Under High-Tech Conditions' is not a doctrine, but "a menu" of conflict scenarios deemed most likely in short- to medium-term by the leadership." [9] The scenarios viewed within the PLA leadership are as stated by Lieutenant-General Mi Zhenyu, a top PLA strategist [10]

1. Limited objectives, which restrict the scale, means and the timing of the war.
2. Very often those objectives are more political-diplomatic oriented than military (for example, wiping out the enemy's manpower).
3. The conflict process is under greater central control, with a political settlement seen at the end result.
4. A complicated international background, which makes the conflict more unpredictable and fast evolving.
5. Although the war is limited, the preparation for its intensity because the room for failure is very narrow.
6. Pre-emptive attack (surgical strike) is a major form of action.
7. Despite the short duration of conflicts, it is very costly, since large quantities of weapons of mass destruction are employed.

The PLA would employ its POEs to fight such scenarios of limited war, particularly in the naval, air, conventional strategic missile, rapid reaction, and special operations capabilities. Thus, it can overcome overall inferiorities to achieve a local and temporary superiority, especially when dealing with an adversary who possesses a more technologically advanced military force. [11] The WZC doctrine is designed for a war of limited scope and short duration against an adversary that is less technologically advanced and powerful than any of the current super powers. The WZC doctrine is NOT designed for a total war whereby a technologically superior superpower is likely to employ the most advanced weapons simultaneously on all fronts and throughout the war process, thus overwhelm and diminish the relevance of these POEs. [12] The PLA's first experiments in the role of Rapid Reaction Units (RRU) of brigade-battalion size force as a POEs was in 1985. The purpose was to test the WZC in responding to "border clashes, accidents and local warfare" [13] After three years of preparation and development of the PLA's capability to respond to a limited war around China's periphery, four experimental exercises were conducted, They were the West-88 conducted by the Lanzhou Military Region (MR) in north-western China; the Extreme Cold-88 by the Beijing MR in northern China; the Advance Forward-88 conducted by the Shenyang MR in north-eastern China and Guangzi-15 [14] conducted by the Guangzhou MR in south China. These exercises assessed the ability of individual military region commanders to conduct theater level military operations as independent campaigns. [15]