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Both China and Taiwan are fond of loudly announcing military developments at the Taiwan Straits to the point of gaudy advertising by the rhetoric of politicians from both sides played up greatly by Chinese and Taiwanese media. One must wonder, if the wisdom of Sun Tzu, who always advocated hiding one’s intentions from his enemy, could truly be applied in the context of the modern China-Taiwan conflict. Third party military analysts of the Taiwan Straits flashpoint region would certainly shake their heads in exasperation of what truly are the intentions of both sides.

Historically always a land power, China saw the defeat of its pre-modern fleet against the Japanese in the late 19 th century, (1894-1895), when it lost eight out of its twelve ships to the modern Japanese fleet. Thereafter, political and social events dictated no need for another establishment of a surface fleet. Indeed, the lack of a strong naval fleet in the 1920s to 1930s, led to a failure in deterring the Japanese land expansion on the Asian continent at the expense of China during the Sino-Japanese War.

From the 1980s onwards, China has, however, been building up its naval assets with rapid modernization as a central strategy, its defense spending in proportion to its rapidly burgeoning economy. The official policy was, of course, a justification for China to defend its long coast lines and to protect its maritime interests in the South China Sea and perhaps beyond. What is obvious, of course, is that a credible navy is necessary in China ’s largely hostile foreign policy towards what it regards as a renegade sea province, Taiwan.

The People’s Liberation Navy of China holds annual exercises of naval maneuvers of a very grand scale, designed to simulate a naval confrontation in the Taiwan Straits followed by a marine invasion of Taiwan.

The Republic of China (ROC) government had also invested heavily in surface fleets as a form of armed deterrence to a rising China ’s strong military and naval forces. Likewise, annual naval exercises were held by Taiwan in simulating an anticipated naval clash with the Chinese fleet and defending from a coastal invasion.

Tactically, both sides entail close co-ordination and co-operation of the navy with other armed services, such as the air force and army. A scenario of potential conflict at the Taiwan Straits would entail an initial phase of a naval-air confrontation at sea, whereby the fleet of either China or Taiwan would be annihilated, then followed with a consecutive phase of a marine invasion of the antagonist’s coast in the manner of victorious pursuit against reeling and disarrayed enemy forces.

In actual reality, the navy performs less of a military role and provides more of a political and economic impact in its state’s strategy in the cases of both China and Taiwan . In March 1996, China openly announced its intention to conduct ballistic missile tests as a form of major military exercises, coinciding with the election process of Taiwan . The coincidence of timing of the exercises and the election process is deliberate, for China intended to exert some external influence on Taiwan ’s re-election of its leaders.

The entire affair escalated into one of face saving and staunch defense of national prestige on both sides, with the ominous presence of two US aircraft carriers as a reminder that the US Navy would not sit idly by should hostilities break out. If missile testing was truly China’s honest intentions, any sea zone devoid of human presence and other ships would suffice, why that particular sensitive oceanic area between Fujian Province and Taiwan? Neither would only two US carriers be sufficient to effectively stop the forces of either China or Taiwan from actually coming to blows if there really was such an intention nursed by either side in the first place.

Once again, we see politics dictating the purpose of military affairs. Gradual arms build up on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, however, coupled with the usual saber-rattling rhetoric of Chinese and Taiwanese politicians, nevertheless, ensure that the Taiwan Straits remain a potential flashpoint for naval conflict determining ultimately the survival of Taiwan.

The writer holds a Master of Science in Strategic Studies from the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS). He currently writes commentaries and analysis articles on international affairs, security issues and terrorism for newspapers. He can be reached at erickoopk@yahoo.com