In the second role of armed cargo ships, that is to make a one-way run-in on a beach or port, direct-fire would be the most likely method of fire support. Tanks, guns, and ATGMs on the decks of a cargo ship could be used with effect. However, the key questions are could a cargo ship even make it to the shore, and what would happen once it got there?

Before cargo ship even approaches any shore defenses there are some potential hazards that must be mitigated. The PLAN would have to have adequate knowledge of Taiwan's coastline to insure no reefs or sandbars stop the ship. Between space intelligence assets, covert reconnaissance, and civilian navigation and tidal charts, the PRC is capable of getting this data regarding natural obstructions. Another potential hazard would be man-made: mines. While the PLA does not have a particularly well developed mine countermeasure force, with 250 miles of Taiwanese coastline facing China there would likely only be a significant mine threat at the most likely landing areas.

A cargo ship would also have to endure fire as it approached the beach. At long range, anti-ship missiles, aircraft, and submarines would pose the greatest threat if these systems were available to a defender. Against these systems, the only hope of an armed cargo ship is that it is one of many targets to choose from. At closer ranges, coastal artillery comes into range. A typical Taiwanese artillery system is the 155mm M114 howitzer. The M114 has a range of about 14 kilometers using standard ammunition. A typical cargo ship can expect to make 12 knots speed. At this rate of closure, an M114 battery placed 1 kilometer from the beach would have about 34 minutes to shell an approaching ship before it made land. This length of time assumes the ship's location is known and the guns survive any counter-battery fire from the armed cargo ships.

Even if a ship's location were known, and large-caliber artillery were brought to bear, the results are far from assured. During World War Two, Operation Chariot involved the intentional grounding of a ship in the lock at Saint Nazaire, France. The approach to the lock was lined with the highest concentration of radar-directed coastal defenses in France.

"Along either bank of the Estuary, as well as in and around the port of St Nazaire itself, were some seventy pieces of ordnance, varying in calibre from 20mm quick-firing cannon up to the 240mm railway guns of Battery Batz, west of La Baule. To defend the approaches of the estuary were heavy 170mm batteries of 280 Naval Artillery Battalion, close by the 150mm Gun Battery and Naval Radar Station on Chemoulin Point. The defence of the port itself, were waiting three battalions of the 22nd Naval Flak Brigade at St Marc [15]."