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The first possible reason, that the PLA needs more amphibious support than the PLAN can provide, is quite plausible. The PLAN as a fire support force is less than optimal. The largest caliber guns that PLAN surface combatants have to offer are 130mm (5.1"), and the ships these guns are mounted on would most likely be very busy in their primary anti-surface and anti-submarine roles. The number of specialized fire support ships such as the YuLiang Class is also very limited. As an amphibious delivery force the PLAN is underequipped for large-scale assaults. Its approximately 60 amphibious transports have an aggregate simultaneous lift capability estimated at only 10,000 to 15,000 troops [1]. To offer a comparison, the invasion of Normandy involved 90,000 troops in an armada of 3,000 landing craft, 2,500 transports, and 500 naval escorts and bombardment ships [2]. These totals do not include the three airborne divisions dropped behind the beaches.

While the invasion of Normandy might seem a much larger operation than the PLA would ever attempt, there are some statistical similarities between D-day and a potential invasion of Taiwan. On June 6, 1944, six allied divisions landed on five beaches along 50 miles of Normandy coast between the Cotentin Peninsula and the Orne River [3]. The defenders roughly averaged 10 miles of shoreline per german division. Taiwan has some 250 miles of western shoreline facing the PRC. With it's active and reserve forces mobilized, Taiwan would be able to defend at a similar 13 miles per division [4]. To achieve a similar force ratio at any given 50 miles of Taiwan beach as the Allies had at Normandy, the PLA would need to land at least 69,000 troops. Of course the raw battlefield calculus does not factor in advancements in technology for both the invaders and defenders, but it does offer a benchmark for the sealift requirements PLA planners envision.