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A Look At People’s Liberation Army Amphibious Sealift Assets
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A Look At People’s Liberation Army Amphibious Sealift Assets
by Xinhui
The Taiwan Strait is often cited as one of the hottest flash points in the world today and with the passing of the People’s Republic of China’s anti-succession law, a move toward formal independence by Taiwan could mean war. In order for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to wage war against Taiwan, they would need significant sealift capabilities to transport troops across the Strait.
When calculating the PLA’s military capability for a cross-strait operation, it is important to determine what amphibious assets the PLA possesses. Surprisingly, an accurate count of landing ships available to the PLA is hard to pinpoint among mainstream sources. As an example, the 2000 edition of the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China by the US Department of Defense credits the PLA with “nearly 50 amphibious landing ships.” (1) The number was reduced to 40 in the 2002 edition. (2) The 2005 edition offered an additional breakdown of the “40 medium and heavy amphibious lift ships” of which 20 Tank Landing Ships (LST) and 15 Medium Landing Ships (LSM) were located with South and East Sea Fleets. (3) Other sources such as Jane’s Amphibious Warfare and Special Forces yearbook offer a different breakdown with 23 LST and 37 LSM (4). A Taiwanese source claimed 20 LST and 63 LSM (5) in June 2004. It is obvious a more accurate accounting is needed, as variation between different sources is as much as 20 percent.
By all accounts, the PLA has the experience and organizational means to utilize civilian assets to augment its military amphibious needs. There are a number of paramilitary and militia organizations such as China Marine Surveillance (CMS), Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), Fishery administration, People’s Armed Police, Customs Patrol, and the Fujian Militia, together totaling hundreds if not thousands of ocean-going ships. However, it is not the purpose of this article to focus on non-military assets.
This is also not a paper focused on the military doctrine and tactics of a cross-strait operation against Taiwan, nor how effective they might be in actual combat, but rather an attempt to quantify what type of amphibious assets and capabilities are currently possessed by the Chinese navy and army. The author recognizes it is not advisable to determine military capabilities by “bean counting” alone; nevertheless, one must start from somewhere.
Photo of captured US made LVTs in PLAN service during the 1950s.
A Brief History:
When the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was founded on April 23, 1949, its amphibious capabilities were extremely weak with little specialized amphibious warfare hardware. However, by the late 1950s many captured US landing ships had been repaired and put back into service supplemented by many small newly built craft; the PLA finally possessed substantial amphibious assets. It had 175 captured Buffalo Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT), 20 ex-US Navy LST (6), 13 ex-US LSM (7), 15 Landing Ship Infantry (LSIL) Types (8), and 10 imported Soviet T-4 LCM. However, throughout much of the Cold War the PLA’s amphibious assets were focused primarily on offshore garrison support and coastal defense. Captured US landing ships and other small craft fulfilled a defensive role only. There is no evidence that the PLAN was postured for offensive amphibious assault until the late 1980s (9) when a small force was capable of conducting an amphibious assault against small islands (10). Amphibious operations against large heavily defended areas such as Taiwan or the coast of Vietnam were far beyond the PLAN’s capabilities (11). In some respects, the rise of Chinese amphibious capability is a recent phenomenon as China military moved out of the survival mode of the Cold War towards the current goal of reunification. Its amphibious assets moved from a defensive posture to an offensive one and new classes of landing ship were built as a result.
The PLA’s sealift capabilities are not under the same expectations as their US military counterparts as most of the PLA amphibious ships are designed to operate over a short range and duration of around 100 KM or 12 hours, the round trip between opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait.
1) U.S. Department of Defense, 2000 Annual report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm
2) U.S. Department of Defense, 2002 Annual report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf
3) U.S. Department of Defense, 2005 Annual report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf
4) “Amphibious Warfare Capabilities, China” Janes’s Amphibious and Special force, August 16, 2005 update.
5) Wawjh “Counter Wave Attack in Anchorage Area” Defense International June 2004 page 85
6) Some known pennant number were: Ex USS LST 804, ex USS 809, ex USS LST 1027, ex USS LST 805, ex USS LST 406, ex Chung 102, 110, 125, 16 and 258
7) Some known pennant number were: Ex USS LSM 112, ex USS LSM 249, ex USS LSM 430, ex USS 336, ex USS LSM 282, ex USS LSM 42, ex USS LSM 153, ex Hua 211, Hua 212
8) Jane’s Fighting ships, 1959 edition.
9) Paul H.B. Godwin, “The Chinese Communist Armed Force” Air University Press, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education. Page 119.
10) Ibid.
11) Ibid.
