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The Political History of Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979,
and the Chinese Concept of Active Defense

Beijing's decision for war with Hanoi was a type of active defense against Moscow expansion into the SE Asia. In Beijing's view, the way to avert a major war was to challenge Soviet advances, disrupt its strategic preparations, and keep it from achieving an advantageous position that might tempt it to launch a major war. There was s strong emotional component to China's decision for war with Vietnam. China's leaders were very angry at what they perceived as Hanoi's ingratitude and duplicity. From Beijing's perspective, China had given North Vietnam consistent, substantial and critical support throughout its long struggle against the French, and then the Americans, but once the Americans were defeated, Hanoi began implementing one anti-China policy after another.

The day after China's invasion began; Moscow issued a statement citing its treaty obligations to Vietnam, calling on China to "stop before it is too late" [11] and demanding an immediate withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnam. Further Soviet warnings were given substance by deployments of Soviet of Soviet naval squadrons off Vietnam's coast and mobilization of Soviet forces along the Xinjing border. The Soviet Union also rushed vital military supplies and Satellite intelligent to Vietnam. But to China's prediction, Soviet took no actual military action to assist Vietnam, and China was able to proclaim publicly that Soviet broke it treaty promise.

While China sent second-line troops from the two Sino-Vietnam border Military Regions into Vietnam, in respond to the possible Soviet attack, PLA forces along the Sino-Soviet border were put on high alert. Some 300,000 civilians evacuated from possible invasion route along the Sino-Soviet border. CMC (Central Military Commission) directed China's best 10 tank divisions and three airborne divisions, 20 artillery divisions, 15 railway engineers and constructions divisions and 11 signal regiments, to react to any Soviet military actions [12]. A dangerous game of chicken was played for the next three weeks between two nuclear-armed nations.

On the diplomatic front, the newly established diplomatic ties with the United States helped Beijing's decision for the gamble; despise Beijing denial Washington did in fact did use her power to protect China from Soviet intervention. The US aircraft carrier Constellation deployed to the Gulf of Tonkin to 'monitor' Soviet naval activates. Deng Xiaoping's public statement about possible joint force against the "Polar Bear" in his visit to the United States in January of 1979 [13] was conspicuously not contradicted by the Carter administration. Deng told Carter during his visit as record by Zbigniew Brzezinski:

"China had concluded that it must disrupt Soviet strategic calculations and that "we consider it necessary to put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited lesson"

He [Deng] then calmly diagnosed for [President Carter and his advisors] various possible Soviet responses, indicating how China would counter them. He included among the options " the worst possibility' adding that even in such a case China would hold out. All he asked for was 'moral support' in the international field from the United States.

"We estimate that the Soviet Union will not take too big an action, I think our action is limited, and it will not give rise to a very big event. [14]

In addition to visit the United State, Deng concluded a 9 days visit to non-communist nations of South East Asia, including Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. And informed those of 'possible' Chinese action. [15]