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In 1643, the Qing sent a 60,000-men force to assault Ningyuan and Shanhaiguan, but it made no further progresses. Apparently, there were still many different opinions inside the Manchu camp. Some of the tribal leaders were content with plundering the Ming Empire, and fear that prolonged settlement in Chinese territory and prolonged assimilation with the Han Chinese would soften the Manchu people (which, supposedly, was the view that Huang Taiji held), while another faction, with Dorgon as a major supporter, advocated the occupation of China, even if it means more contacts with Han Chinese and their culture. In any case, with Wu Sangui's forces strongly entrenched in Ningyuan, a general assault into China is still difficult, as the early raiding campaigns under Huang Taiji proved.

Around that time, the Manchus, apparently during their last raiding campaign into North China (which touched North China as far south as Shandong province) came to hear about the exploits of the Shun. Therefore, it was said that Dorgon sent emissaries to Xi'an to propose to join forces with Li Zicheng in the partition of North China. However, no contact between the Manchus and the Shun were ever established, whether Li Zicheng was not interested, the Manchu emissaries could not reach Xi'an, or even perhaps Dorgon never did send the emissaries in the first place. In any case, since April 1644 the situation was significantly different, for the Ming Empire is now dead and Li Zicheng became the dominant power in North China. If Dorgon wants North China, he will have to deal with Li Zicheng first.

In the days after the fall of Beijing, Dorgon led the Manchu Army toward the Chinese border, apparently realizing that a power vacuum existed in China after the fall of the Ming. What was the Manchus' intension is still a mystery. Perhaps they expect to occupy portions of North China (possibly Hebei and Shandong provinces, which were the targets of previous Manchu raids) before Li Zicheng consolidate the rich portions of North China into his Shun Empire, but in any case, with Li Zicheng strongly entrenched in the capital, this move seemed impossible. It was possible at that moment certain Manchu leaders such as Dorgon begin to fear that Li Zicheng had beaten them in the course of establishing an empire over the dead Ming state, so Dorgon must have been very delighted when Wu Sangui proposed to join forces with him against Li Zicheng.

Counting on exact numbers, the eight banners yield 60,000 Manchu regulars. Possibly, there's a similar number of reservists, men too young or too old to fight. However, for campaigns out of their homeland, the Manchus rarely commit a large percentage of their main forces. When Nurhaci was fighting for his newborn state's survival in 1619, and when Huang Taiji fought the crucial Battle of Songshan, on each occasion the Manchu had at most 60,000 troops. Because of the numerical weakness of the Manchu state, therefore the Manchus relied heavily on Han and Mongol troops. Shang Kexi, Kong Youde, Geng Jimao, and other Liaodong militants probably offer the Manchus around 20,000 Han troops. Some of them are cavalry and infantry armed with matchlocks, but the most important gift to the Manchus were Han artillerymen. From the subjugated Mongols, the Manchus probably can call on 20,000 to 30,000 horsemen. So in 1644, the Manchurian kingdom can probably call on a total force of nearly 180,000 soldiers, and using the 1/3 rule (only 1/3 of the forces are readily available, the other 2/3 in training or off-duty), Dorgon probably led a force of 60,000 Manchu, Han, and Mongol combined arms force.

It must be remember that even though the Manchus were tough horse-mounted soldiers, they differ from the Mongol hordes, who are truly nomadic people. Unlike the Mongols, who relied on a herd-raising economy, the Manchus, like their Nuzhen ancestors, were much more sedentary. True, the Manchus are herd-raisers, but they are also part-time fishers, subsistence farmers, and miners. Even before Nurhaci's time, Manchus live in semi-fortified villages and hamlets, where they can trade farm goods, ginseng, and precious metals with themselves and outsiders. Perhaps, this is a reason why many would argue that the Mongols were hardier horsemen than the Manchus. It was no exaggeration that while the Manchus relied on the Han Chinese for manpower and firepower, they also relied on the Mongols for hard-hitting mobility.