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PLA Air Force Operation and Modernization

by Kenneth W. Allen

End Notes (3/3)

71) "First Flight for F-10 Paves Way for Production," Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 May 1998, 17.

72) This agreement was important psychologically to China and to China's neighbors. Not only was China going to receive a modern aircraft with offensive capabilities, but it meant that Russia might be willing to sell China other modern weapons .

73) "China?assembled Su?27s Make Their First Flights," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vo. 31, No. 8, 24 February 1999.

74) Based on interviews in Asia, the PLAAF has configured a handful of B-6 bombers as tankers and is currently using them to refuel J-8II interceptors in the Guangzhou Military Region.

75) According to several reports, the current contract stipulates that the Chinese share of components will only reach seventy percent. The AL?31F turbofan engine and various avionics are not among the items that will be license produced by China. The contract also prohibits any changes ever to the Su-27s or any exports without Russian authorization. (Nikolay Novichkov, "China To Begin Licensed Production of Su-27CK Fighters," ITAR-TASS in English, 13 November 1997. "Licensed Building of Russian Fighters about to Begin in China," Itar-Tass, 2 October 1998. Although the first report identifies the Su-27 variant for China as the Su-27CK, the second report identifies it as the Su-27SK.) While some sources who have toured the Shenyang factory state that manufacturing capabilities and procedures are generally poor and could take several years before successfully assimilating Russian manufacturing technologies, other sources have stated that the Su-27 is not an advanced aircraft from a manufacturing standpoint. It is an all metal airframe with only limited exotic materials/manufacturing processes, such as titanium components, which might cause some difficulties. Each is hand built and is not significantly more advanced than the J-8 airframe built at Shenyang. A clause in the SU-27 contract stipulates that if Shenyang fails to meet the annual production target of ten to fifteen aircraft, then Russia's facility at Komsomolsk will provide the substitute aircraft. Even though China is not allowed to produce the AL-31F engine, which is also being used for the J-10, China is trying to purchase an engine repair maintenance facility, so that they do not have to continue sending the engines back to Russia for repair ("Licensed Building of Russian Fighters about to Begin in China," Itar-Tass, 2 October 1998). According to some analysts, the Chinese have not asked for licensed production yet of the AL-31F engine and existing avionics incorporated in the Su-27, because they are waiting to see if their indigenous engine and avionics programs will be successful. China's domestic development programs in these areas are based on purchases of or negotiations for some engine and avionics technology that is more advanced than what is in the Su-27 (Department of Defense analyst).

76) "'Made in China' deal is forged for Su-27s," Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 May 1995, Vol. 23, No. 18, 3.

77) Department of Defense engineer.

78) According to an August 19, 1998 Jane's Defence Weekly article, China and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding to open formal negotiations on China's proposed purchase of more than twenty SU-30s from Russia and is discussing the transfer of production technology. The latest report from the Central News Agency out of Hong Kong on June 21, 1999, and Defense News says that Moscow has decided to sell fifty to seventy-two of its front?line SU-30 jet fighter-bombers to Beijing. The cost of the aircraft will be $37 million a copy. In addition, the Central News Agency reported that negotiations for Moscow to grant a license for the production of another 250 SU-30 fighters in China have begun as well. Like the wide range or reporting over the past nine years on the Su-27s, It will still take some time before the actual terms of the contract are available.

79) Department of Defense engineer. The Su-30MKK does not include thrust vectoring or the Su-30's distinctive canard. Information from the air show suggests that the Su-30MKK has an upgraded Slot Back2 to allow air-to-ground operations and air-to-ground munitions. The only other big difference over the Su-27SK is that it does include aerial refueling. Therefore, this aircraft will be able to perform deep strike missions normally performed by B-5 Beagle bombers, yet still retain an air superiority capabilities, making it similar to the F-15E.

80) "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," Report submitted by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the US Senate as directed by the FY99 Appropriations Bill, 17 February 1999.

81) In 1956, the Soviets and Chinese signed a contract to build a medium bomber factory at Xian, and in September 1957, the Soviets gave China the rights to produce the TU-16. In February 1959, the Soviets turned over the plans for the TU-16, as well as two aircraft and one unassembled aircraft to Harbin, where the first flight took place in September 1959. The Xian production facility was completed in 1961, and the TU-16 production capability was transferred there from Harbin between 1962-1964. Strength tests of the first indigenously-produced B-6 were completed in October 1966, and the first test flight took place on 24 December 1968. The B-6 entered series production in 1969. Development of the B-6D began in 1975, and the first flight took place on 29 August 1981. On 6 December 1981, it conducted telemetered bomb tests at a bomb range, and conducted live testing at the end of 1983.

82) "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," Report submitted by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the US Senate as directed by the FY99 Appropriations Bill, 17 February 1999.

83) Ibid.

84) Interview with Ministry of Defense officials in New Delhi.

85) "Delivery of China's upgraded Il-76 AEW system is delayed," Flight International, 19-25 August 1998, 21.

86) According to one Department of Defense analyst, the probability of success for the Il-76/Phalcon program will be quite good, especially if the Israelis provide support as in the J-10 program. The Phalcon system makes extensive use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products which gives them easy access to the basic building blocks of the system. The system is extremely capable and has DOD officials concerned. The Phalcon system was a competitor in the recent Australian Wedgetail AEW competition. The system is much more than an AEW and has full AWACS capabilities. In addition, the Wedgetail proposal included Australian industrial participation. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to believe that the Israelis offered the Chinese industrial participation to seal this high dollar deal.

87) Desmond Ball, "Signals Intelligence in China," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol 7., No. 8, 1 August 1995, 365.

88) "Elint aircraft put into service," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol 31, No. 12, 24 March 1999. Based on discussions with various analysts, there are indications that the information about the Tu-154s deploying to the Nanjing Military Region may be an attempt at disinformation.

89) "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," Report submitted by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the US Senate as directed by the FY99 Appropriations Bill, 17 February 1999.

90) "NAF Regiment Improves New Aircraft," People's Navy, 18 June 1998.

91) Department of Defense analyst.

92) "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," Report submitted by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the US Senate as directed by the FY99 Appropriations Bill, 17 February 1999.

93) Min Zengfu and Han Jibing, "Air Defense Pattern of the 21st Century: Large-Area Dynamic Joint Air Defense," Jiefangjun Bao, 14 July 1998.

94) Ibid.

95) Sun Maoqing, "Make Efforts To Build Modernized People's Air Force: Interview With Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Liu Shunyao," Beijing Liaowang, FBIS, 14 April 1997, No 15, 20-21.

96) Robert Karniol, "Briefing - Military Modernisation in Asia," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 July 2000.

97) "China seeks S-300 and Tor-M1 systems," Jane's Defense Weekly, 2 September 1998, 16. The PLA's S-300MU1 can intercept aircraft-sized targets at ranges up to 150 kilometers and ballistic type targets at ranges up to 40 kilometers. The Tor-M1 is a low-to-medium altitude self-propelled SAM which entered Russian service in 1991.

98) "Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8-25 March 1996," briefing presented by the US Office of Naval Intelligence at a conference on the PRC's military modernization sponsored by the Alexis de Tocqueville Institute, 11 March 1997.

99) "China shows new AWACS-killer missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol 30, No. 11, September 16, 1998. Paul Beaver, "China flexes muscles in missile exercise," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol 32, No. 5, 4 August 1999.

100) "PLAAF aircraft target Taiwan Aircraft," United Daily News, August 5, 1999. "Taiwan Air Force Monitoring China Air Force Movements," Taipei Chung-Yang Jih-Pao in Chinese, FBIS, 4 August 1999, 10. "PLAAF aircraft target Taiwan Aircraft," United Daily News, 5 August 1999. "Taiwan Air Force Monitoring China Air Force Movements," Taipei Chung-Yang Jih-Pao in Chinese, FBIS, 4 August 1999, 10. These reports stated: 1) Two PLAAF J-8 fighters crossed the center line of the Strait on July 25 and two J-7 fighters crossed the center line on July 30. Shortly after the planes crossed the line, they corrected their routes and returned to the west side of the center line; 2) The J-7s and J-8s from Fuzhou and Longxi airbases were flying over the Strait on a daily basis; 3) Su-27 fighters stationed at Suixi airbase in Guangdong Province began training activities in areas close to the center line. (The Su-27s from Wuhu airbase in Anhui Province were probably also involved); 4) There was no truth to reports that PLAAF Su-27s locked on with their fire control radars to two Taiwan Mirage 2000 fighters over the Taiwan Strait on August 2; and 5) About 340 international flights and 730 domestic flights fly over the Taiwan Strait daily.

101) Victor Lai, "PRC Jet Fighters Twice Cross Taiwan Strait Center Line," Central News Agency, Taipei, 10 August 1999.

102) "Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8-25 March 1996," briefing presented by the US Office of Naval Intelligence at a conference on the PRC's military modernization sponsored by the Alexis de Tocqueville Institute, 11 March 1997.

103) Lo Ping, "It Costs China 3 Billion Yuan to Make a Show of Its Military Strength," Cheng Ming, Hong Kong, 15 April 1996. Steven Mufson, "China Masses Troops On Coast Near Taiwan," The Washington Post, 14 February 1996.

104) "Mainland Fighters Said To Appear Above Taiwan Straits," Taipei Tzu-Li Wan-Pao, 26 November 1998 (FBIS-CHI-98-333, 29 November 1998).

105) State Department Briefing with James Rubin, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, 3 August 1999.

106) Interview with government official.

107) Lu Xingsheng, "Taiwan Haixia Cong Wei Cun Zaiguo Shenma 'Zhong Xian' [The Taiwan Strait has Never Had a Center Line]," Shanghai Xinmin Weekly, No. 34, 23-29 August 1999, 9.

108) Taiwan's Air Force has now received all of its 130 IDF, 60 Mirage, and 150 F-16 fighters.

109) State Department Briefing with James Rubin, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, 3 August 1999.

110) Victor Lai, "PRC Jet Fighters Twice Cross Taiwan Strait Center Line," Central News Agency, 10 August 1999. This includes about 340 international flights and 730 domestic flights per day.

111) Republic of China: 1998 National Defense Report (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd. 1998), 184-185. Almost none of these aircraft have any standoff weapons launch capability. Therefore, they would not be that effective in reaching Taiwan unless China were to take out most of Taiwan's air defense capability with ballistic and cruise missiles first.

112) "Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8-25 March 1996," briefing presented by the US Office of Naval Intelligence at a conference on the PRC's military modernization sponsored by the Alexis de Tocqueville Institute, 11 March 1997.

113) Sergey Sokut and Ilya Kedrov, "War in Europe: Yugoslavia: 78 Days Under Missile and Bombing Attacks: NATO's Limited War Was Uncompromising," Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, FBIS, 2-8 July 1999, No 25, 2.

114) Allen, Kenneth W., People's Republic of China, People's Liberation Army Air Force, Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, May 1991, Section 2.

115) "Taiwan Air Force Monitoring China Air Force Movements," Taipei Chung-Yang Jih-Pao, Internet, 4 August 1999.

116) Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), 64.

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