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There is no simple description of the PLAAF's operational capabilities. The PLAAF is in the process of modernizing, but it still has a long way to go. Parts of the PLAAF are clearly obsolete, yet other parts have the most modern, sophisticated aircraft, SAMs, and software. The key to the PLAAF's modernization is integrating all of the different components, including its branches and new and old weapon systems, into a single operational unit within the PLAAF and with the rest of the PLA as a whole. As one China watcher recently stated, "It is not just a matter of the glass being half empty or half full, because the glass is getting bigger."

During discussions of the PLAAF, a former US Air Force Chief of Staff identified the following questions that he would want to know about China's airpower:

As discussed in this paper, the PLAAF clearly comes up lacking in most of these categories. However, during interviews in Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and India, defense officials repeatedly said that the United States cannot just look at the PLAAF through Western eyes. Everyone in these countries agreed that the PLAAF is not necessarily capable of sustained combat today, but it is moving in the direction of a more modern offensive force over the next fifteen to twenty years. Each of these countries is looking carefully at China's intentions and taking the long-term view of China's potential capabilities.

At the same time, however, it is my opinion based on interviews in the region that most of the countries surrounding China do not have a thorough understanding of the PLAAF. For example, other than Taiwan and Japan, there are very few assets or analysts dedicated to just the PLAAF. The majority of the countries in Asia have only one military attaché in Beijing, most of whom do not speak Chinese, and who concentrate primarily on the macro-level PLA strategic issues, rather than on operational capabilities. In addition, most of the countries in Asia focus only on the PLAAF forces in their immediate border region, rather than on the PLAAF as a whole. They also tend to focus on hardware issues only (i.e., how many Su-27s does China have), rather than on the software issues.

The PLAAF is still primarily a defensive force, but, through the acquisition of systems with longer ranges and more lethal bombs and missiles, is moving gradually toward having an offensive capability. Although the PLAAF is acquiring some systems to support the air defense mission, such as refueling, ECM, and airborne early warning platforms, it will be several years before these systems can be fully integrated into the force, and even then, only in limited numbers. The PLAAF still lacks precision guided munitions and a battlespace surveillance capability, but China is working on these capabilities. The PLAAF is beginning to train its forces in mobile operations, but is still hindered by institutional, organizational, and equipment limitations that hinder mobile operations. Furthermore, the PLAAF is not yet capable of round-the-clock or sustained operations.

There is little doubt that what the PLAAF has done over the past decade is impressive. The Air Force has acquired limited numbers of Russia's most sophisticated weapon systems, but still must rely on Russia for long-term logistics support. The PLAAF will continue to rely on imported weapons systems to modernize its force, but is moving toward developing and producing better domestic engines, avionics, and missiles. Air combat training has become more realistic, including more live air-to-air missile launch training, but the pilots still lack sufficient flying hours due to engine and airframe limitations. While the PLAAF's Blue Force aggressor program has obviously been successful, it has pointed out even more starkly the limitations of aircraft like the J-6, J-7, and J-8.

With the acquisition of several Russian Il-76 transports, the PLAAF's 15th Airborne Army has been able to train in more locations around China, but the focus is still on use for domestic situations rather than situations outside China's borders.

Although Commander Liu Shunyao states that the PLAAF has the capability to support ground and naval operations, the Air Force's ability to do this is questionable. The PLA as a whole is just beginning to address joint operations and logistics. Very little information is available in open source material about PLAAF support for the Navy, which would entail joint exercises and some type of joint command and control structure. As for supporting the ground forces, the PLAAF has consistently stated that it cannot provide direct support for the ground forces. Nothing has occurred over the past decade to change this philosophy. While the Su-30 will replace the B-5 in the interdiction and deep strike mission, there are not ready replacements for the A-5, whose mission is battle field interdiction and ground attack.

While the PLAAF can look proudly at its accomplishments in equipment acquisition and training over the past decade, the bulk of the aviation force still consists of aging J-6, J-7, and J-8 interceptors, only some of which have an all-weather capability. China's aviation industry is working toward designing and producing a modern aircraft to meet the PLAAF's needs in fifteen years, but will still need foreign assistance from Russia and Israel along the way. Therefore, the PLAAF will still be relying on Russian support for the near term. Once China's next generation of domestically produced aircraft, such as the J-10, improved FB-7, and XXJ, are operationally deployed, we will have a better understanding of how far China's aviation industry has come.

The PLAAF will continue to analyze its needs and implement changes as it can, but there will also continue to be resource and system limitations that will hinder the PLAAF's overall modernization drive and operational capabilities. China will eventually have to face the fact that there are limitations on how many foreign aircraft it can buy. If the PLAAF is going to replace its current fleet of aircraft, it will have to rely on China's aviation industry to provide much of the necessary components or they will not be able to afford it. The PLAAF simply cannot afford to continue purchasing Russian aircraft at $35-40 million apiece, plus rely on the Russian supply line. Finally, the PLAAF's leadership must also accept aircraft losses as part of a more vigorous, realistic training program.

In closing, a clear distinction must be made between the PLAAF's capabilities and intentions. Even if the PLAAF is not the most modern force, the PLAAF's leaders will salute smartly and use every means available to achieve victory if the CMC tasks them to go into battle.