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On July 9, 1999, President Lee Teng-hui in Taiwan declared that relations between Taiwan and mainland China should be conducted on a "state-to-state" basis. Shortly thereafter, the PLAAF increased the number of sorties over the Taiwan Strait, including crossing over the center line of the Strait several times. (100) This issue generated a lot of interest and speculation about the possibility of an aircraft incident occurring, either by accident or on purpose by either side, that could start a war across the Strait.

On August 10, a Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson stated that "eight J-8 fighters have deployed to Fuzhou airbase and are conducting flights over the Taiwan Strait. There are about 150 aircraft permanently stationed in Fujian's coastal areas. In addition, Su-27 fighters stationed in Guangdong Province have begun training activities in areas close to the center line." (101) Although not stated, the Su-27s were probably flying direct missions to and from the Strait from their home base at Suixi. The Su-27s stationed at Wuhu were probably also involved.

Although the number of PLAAF sorties increased following President Lee's statement, this was not really new activity. The PLAAF was actively involved during the PLA's large-scale exercises opposite Taiwan during March 1996. According to available open source material, The exercise included 12,000 Air Force and 3,000 Naval air force servicemen. More than 280 aircraft deployed to the exercise area and conducted 680 sorties, including eighty-two transport sorties. Over 800 combat aircraft were within a combat readiness of 550 miles or were on the alert. Another report stated the PLA deployed fewer than 100 additional aircraft to the thirteen Fujian airfields from other bases, raising the total to only 226 aircraft. Based on a briefing by the US Office of Naval Intelligence, the PLA conducted a total of 1,755 sorties during the exercise. (102) Further press reporting stated that the PLAAF deployed aircraft from its second and third-line airfields to first-line airfields, where they conducted their exercise activity. It took about 3.5 hours for the PLAAF fighters to prepare for takeoff, compared to the ten hours they had needed previously. In addition, the PLAAF demonstrated rapid aircraft sortie regeneration of forty minutes, which was considerably quicker than the past. (103)

In November 1998, the commander of a Taiwan Air Force Mirage-2000 fighter group stated,

BFollowing the air battles that took place over the Taiwan Strait in 1958, our fighters have kept a distance of 35 miles from the mainland's coast, while the Chinese Communist fighters usually carry out their duties close to their own coast line. If two Communist jet fighters took off, the Taiwan Air Force would dispatch four planes to watch them. Maintaining a tacit agreement on an invisible center line of the Strait, neither side has conducted any provocative flights. In the past, there was a tacit agreement that "we leave when you come, and we come when you leave." Recently, however, the Chinese Communist fighters have conducted frequent intentional flights across the central line of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan Air Force F?16 and Mirage 2000 aircraft could detect Chinese Communist fighters on their radar screens. The Communist aircraft were probably attempting to collect information about the training of our new?generation fighters. (104)

There are several explanations for the increased activity, in addition to reacting to President Lee's statement. Since its founding in 1949, the PLAAF has consistently tried to carry out its mission of controlling China's airspace. During the early 1950s, the PLAAF was a fledgling service and focused all of its efforts in the northeast and on the Korean War. During that period, Taiwan's Air Force controlled the skies over southeast China as far north as Shanghai. Therefore, besides defending the border with Korea, the PLAAF's immediate task was to provide air defense for the major cities, such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin. It was not until after the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis that the PLAAF had a permanent presence in the provinces opposite Taiwan. Even then, Taiwan continued to fly U-2 reconnaissance flights over the mainland until the late 1960s. Since 1958, there have not been any serious air engagements over the Strait.

According to a Taiwan MND spokesman in August 1999, "Following Beijing's 1996 military exercise, Communist Chinese aircraft have been flying more often in the Taiwan Strait." (105) Although the media began focusing on the PLAAF's increased air activity after President Lee's statement, a knowledgeable source in Taiwan indicated that the PLAAF began increasing its flight activity near the center line in June 1998. (106)

There are several probable reasons why the PLAAF has stepped up its flight activity over the Strait since 1996 and near the center line in 1998. First, the CMC wanted to challenge the fact that Taiwan's Air Force has basically owned the entire airspace over the Taiwan Strait since the 1950s and the PLAAF could not effectively challenge this control. Taiwan's fighter and reconnaissance aircraft have routinely crossed the centerline, and transport aircraft ferry supplies to troops on Jinmen and Mazu. The PLAAF had little choice but to have a tacit agreement on the centerline, so that it could at least have the facade of some control over the Strait. Even so, the mainland officially refutes the idea of a center line, stating that Taiwan is a part of China, so there cannot be a center line over a body of water that belongs to China. (107)

The PLAAF also probably felt compelled to react to significant changes in Taiwan's Air Force or lose the opportunity to have any presence at all over the Strait. These changes included Taiwan's Air Force commissioning its first indigenous defensive fighter (IDF) squadron in December 1994, and the first French Mirage 2000-5 and US F-16 squadrons in October 1997. Liu Shunyao, who became the new PLAAF commander in December 1996, began emphasizing the PLAAF's offensive capabilities when Taiwan received the first Mirages and F-16s in April 1997. (108)

During July and August 1999, only twelve PLAAF aircraft were airborne at any time, not all of which were over the Strait, and the PLAAF flew only about thirty total sorties per day. (109) However, these sorties were a significant change for both air forces. Over 1,000 civil air flights fly through Taiwan's airspace daily. (110) Most of the airspace immediately north and south of Taiwan, flying to/from Taipei and Kaohsiung, is dedicated to civil air routes, which means that Taiwan's Air Force is forced to conduct its training in the Strait and to the east of the island. These sorties, and any future such activity, force Taiwan's Air Force to divert aircraft from their regular training regimen to conduct patrol duties (punching holes in the sky) in the Strait. Although the PLAAF did not fly that many sorties in the Strait, Beijing sent a clear message that the PLAAF could fly in the Strait if it wanted to.