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During the 1990s, the PLAAF has upgraded its air defense (non-aircraft) capabilities. This involves three of the PLAAF's branches: SAM, AAA, and radar troops. While the PLAAF has modernized its SAMs significantly in terms of quality, if not quantity, the overall air defense network is quite weak. According to the DoD assessment,

Beijing is expending tremendous effort establishing an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) at both the strategic and tactical levels. China's air defense technology currently lags behind western standards and its current IADS capability lacks many crucial components. Beijing probably could establish a fully operational national IADS within the next twenty years, but clearly not by 2005. China has a rudimentary tactical IADS capability in the form of its mobile Tactical Air Defense System (TADS). (92)

The PLA readily admits that it has problems with its air defense network. For example, a 14 July 1998 article in Jiefangjun Bao provided insight into this problem. The article stated that,

Air battles in the 21st century will be a form of combat which shows information warfare at its highest. In order to seize superiority in information, the attacking side will adopt electronic suppression, electronic deception, and route selection to prevent the defensive side from reacting on time. Stealth planes, in particular, will greatly reduce the detection range. The PLAAF will have to advance its air defense early warning equipment in order to be able to detect invading targets early, extend the early warning range, and seize the necessary time and space for fighting air defense battles. (93)

As precision guidance technology develops, the launch distance of different types of air-to-ground missiles and aerial guided bombs will increase. These advancements will result in combat aircraft changing their methods of launching surprise attacks against ground targets. Instead of overhead bombing, the aircraft can now launch munitions from outside the enemy's range of fire or even from outside the air defense area. If the PLAAF continues to use the method of air defense at key points or key areas, attacking aircraft will have already completed their bombing and safely returned home before the PLAAF's air defense system could even react. Therefore, the PLAAF must enlarge its effective air defense area and shoot down enemy aircraft before they can even launch their air?to?ground weapons. The PLAAF must persist in a dynamic air defense system by moving forces rapidly and concentrating firepower in order to enlarge the effective air defense area. The PLA must also organize all of its air defense forces under centralized and unified operational command. (94)

Given the PLAAF's acknowledged weakness in these areas, Commander Liu has stated the Air Force's SAM units are engaged in an evolution from single-type air defense missiles and equipment to new integrated air defense systems, combining high, medium, and low-altitude, long and short-range missiles. (95)

Since the early 1990s, the PLAAF has purchased two regiments of S-300 (SA-10) and one regiment of Tor-M1 (SA-15)SAMs from Russia. (96) During late 1998, Beijing was reportedly negotiating with Moscow to acquire two additional S-300 regiments and one Tor-M1 regiment. (97) Although most of the S-300s are currently based near Beijing, some of them were reportedly deployed near Fuzhou during the 1996 Taiwan Strait exercise for exercise play and as a precautionary measure. (98)

China has also developed the FT-2000 mobile SAM. This SAM is based on the S-300 and is designed to engage radiating aircraft, such as airborne jammers and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. China first tested the FT-2000 in September 1998, then conducted the first field trials during a series of exercises in 1999. (99)