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The PLAAF's weapons systems are a combination of old, modified, and new aviation (aircraft) and air defense (SAM and AAA) systems. Since the early 1990s, the PLAAF has retired over 1,000 of its older combat aircraft, storing them at Rugao airfield in central China. (65) According to the US Department of Defense's report on the Taiwan Strait balance,

The PLAAF inventory includes over 2,200 obsolete J-6/Farmer fighters (last produced in 1979), several hundred J-7/Fishbed and J-8/ Finback fighters, and over forty Su-27/Flankers. In addition, the PLAAF has 500 A-5/Fantan (modified MiG-19) ground attack aircraft and about 500 bombers, including B-6/Badger and obsolete B-5/Beagle. Both its aerial refueling and airborne early warning (AEW) programs are behind schedule, as are several of its indigenous aircraft development programs. By 2005, the PLAAF will possess nearly 2,200 tactical fighter aircraft, 500 ground attack aircraft, and 400 bombers, as older aircraft are retired. The majority of the mainland's air fleet still will be composed of second and third generation aircraft augmented by a limited number of fourth generation platforms. (66)

By 2010, the PLAAF's fighter force will most likely consist of between 1,500 and 2,000 aircraft, with almost all of the J-6s and early model J-7s retired. The remaining force will consist of modified J-7s and J-8s. (67) These aircraft will initially be complemented by, and then replaced by, the J-11 (Su-27), J-10, and Su-30. The J-10 was developed to replace the J-6, J-7, and A-5. The Su-27 (J-11) is an air superiority aircraft, replacing the J-8 in this mission - both aircraft are produced at the Shenyang Aircraft Company. The Su-30 is being purchased for deep strike/interdiction and air superiority, much like the U.S. F-15E, and will replace the older B-5/Beagle bombers. All of these newer aircraft will have greater range and payload, and will not replace the older aircraft on a one-for-one basis.

There are differing opinions about the long-term viability of various indigenous programs, such as the J-7, J-8, and J-10 program, all of which have been considered for elimination at one time or another since the mid-1970s. During the 1970s and 1980s, China had no alternatives to domestic production, these programs had a history of important bureaucratic support, and hundreds of millions of dollars had already been spent on the programs. Therefore, they continued through the 1980s at a moderate pace, while they began searching for foreign aircraft. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the aviation ministry opted to provide significant upgrades to these aircraft using domestic and foreign subsystems and foreign technical assistance. (68)

Over the past decade, some analysts have had doubts whether the J-10, which is under development in Chengdu, will eventually be operationally deployed, while others have predicted that the J-10 will become one of the PLAAF's most important fighters in the next century. (69) The J-10 program began in the late 1960s. After numerous technical difficulties, the Israelis were asked in the early 1980s to assist them with a new design based on the Israeli Lavi (U.S. F-16 derivative) fighter, and full scale cooperation began officially by 1984. The J-10 project was launched on a full scale in 1987 and began receiving Russian assistance in the early 1990s. (70) The J-10 conducted its first test flight in March 1998, at least two years behind schedule, and is still undergoing testing and evaluation as more prototypes are produced. Predictions for deployment to an operational base range from 2003 to 2010, depending upon problems encountered in the test and evaluation phase. The J-10, which most likely will be armed with advanced beyond visual range (BVR), active radar (AR) air-to-air missiles (AAM) and may be air refuelable, is designed for counter-air and interdiction, like the Lavi and F-16. (71)

One of the PLAAF's most significant events in the past fifty years was China's agreement with Russia in 1990 to purchase forty-eight SU-27 fighters and then to "produce" up to 200 of the aircraft in China over the next ten to fifteen years. (72) The SU-27s produced in China will be known as the J-11. The first batch of twenty-six aircraft arrived at the 3rd Air Division in Wuhu (Nanjing Military Region) in 1992, followed by a second group of twenty-two more at Suixi airfield (Guangzhou MR) in 1996. The first two domestically assembled Su-27s reportedly made their initial flights in December 1998. (73) According to the DoD report, the Su-27s are the only fighter aircraft in the PLAAF inventory with sufficient combat radius to allow extended operations beyond China's borders. (74) Like the J-10 program, there are differing opinions about the long-term viability of the Su-27/J-11 program. (75) While some analysts focus on the negative aspects of the program, such as Russia's restrictions on allowing China to produce the avionics and engines, other analysts note that China is moving ahead rapidly to develop its own engines and avionics for the aircraft and will not need the Russian systems.

Reports from Russia indicate that China is negotiating to purchase an additional 20 Su-27UBK two-seat trainer aircraft at a price of $35 million dollars each. The PLAAF originally received a total of four trainers along with twenty-four single-seat Su-27s for Wuhu and twenty-two single-seat Su-27s for Suixi. (76) Some analysts predict the PLAAF will purchase as many as 40-60 Su-27UBK to complement the full production run of approximately 200 J-11s. The PLAAF typically has four to six trainers per regiment. The Su-27UBK is fully combat capable and will likely be used to train pilots for both the Su-27SK and Su-30MKK. Delivery of the first trainers is expected within the next year, but the delivery schedule will probably match the production schedule of the J-11s at Shenyang, which will take the rest of the decade to complete. (77)

China is also negotiating with Russia to acquire and possibly co-produce the Su-30 multi-role aircraft that the PLAAF would use for deep strike/interdiction and air superiority. Although China is fully expected to receive some Su-30s, probably in 2001, there is still much confusion and speculation about the actual number and terms of the contract, including whether or not they will be co-produced in China. The figures have ranged from purchase of twenty to seventy-two aircraft and co-production of up to 250 aircraft. (78) There are also questions about whether the PLA Navy's Air Force will also receive the Su-30. Information from the 1999 Moscow air show indicates the Su-30MKK version being offered to China is significantly less capable than the Su-30MKI sold to India. (79)