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In 1958, the PLAAF built a large center for testing its AAMs and SAMs in the Gobi Desert near Dingxin, Gansu Province. (56) During the mid-1990s, the Air Force began expanding this base to include a large tactics training center, where multiple PLAAF units could practice the tactics developed at Cangzhou and tested in individual units throughout the force. An October 1996 Jiefangjun Bao article described the training center as follows:

The Air Force recently established a modern, comprehensive air tactics training base marked by combat training under actual combat conditions. The training base has air and ground tactical training ranges, simulated runways built to scale, a SAM base, AAA positions, radars, radar support vehicles, simulated enemy command posts, ammunition depots, and oil depots, which look real. A large number of simulated tanks are also deployed in combat positions. (57)

Training directors and air division commanders receive air combat reports, direct air battles, and communicate with combat planes in the air. They monitor units in the exercise, and direct unit deployment and movement in a timely fashion through use of the base's advanced facilities. A monitoring, control, and appraisal system installed in the base's command center receives information in a timely manner on each plane's flight path, course, speed, altitude, and other parameters. The system monitors the activity through video recording, radar, and flight orientation systems, so training directors will have accurate information to evaluate the training results. (58)

The training center probably includes the mock up of a Taiwan Air Force airfield. According to an April 1999 report in Taiwan's China Times Express, "China has built a military airfield near Dingxin airfield in northwestern Gansu Province, that is identical to the Taiwan Air Force's Chingchuankang (CCK) airbase in central Taiwan, so the PLAAF can practice bombing the island." (59) Building mock enemy airfields is not an uncommon practice among air forces of the world, and provides realistic training opportunities.

Following the PLAAF's participation in the joint service exercise near Taiwan in early 1996, the PLAAF conducted a two-day, large-scale, offensive-defensive exercise utilizing its aggressor unit at the Gobi Desert training center during September 1996.

The exercise directors made it clear from the beginning that this exercise was to be conducted under unknown conditions. Almost all of the exercise's contents were new to the PLAAF participants, including using dissimilar aircraft in coordinated, joint offensive?counteroffensive attacks against ground targets and in air-to-air combat under electronic warfare conditions. The Air Force conducted the exercise under the principle that none of the participants would receive prior information about the enemy's deployments, combat tasks, battlefield targets, or flight routes during different stages of the exercise. The exercise, which was almost canceled because one of the participating aircraft crashed en route, included aerial combat to seize air superiority, bomber and ground attack aircraft strikes on targets after avoiding enemy intercepting planes, and airborne landing and anti-airborne landing operations. (60)

This report provides a valuable glimpse at the PLAAF's combat philosophy. Specifically, the directors assumed that they will know very little about the enemy just before or during the battle, due to the lack of real-time reconnaissance capabilities. Therefore, the attack must be planned on insufficient data. Yet another Xinhua report in 1998 stated, "During an early 1997 live-fire exercise involving various types of planes, command posts of eight air divisions explored tactics and conducted training on the base's advanced training systems and facilities." (61) Although the number of aircraft involved in these exercises was not specified, the PLAAF's philosophy has been to deploy overwhelming numbers of aircraft to a theater. For example, during the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, the PLAAF deployed approximately 700 aircraft to the border area. However, while air force officials in Taiwan speculate that the PLAAF would attack Taiwan with waves totaling several hundred aircraft, there are no indications in PLAAF writings that it routinely trains with more than 4-8 aircraft in the air at a time.

The PLAAF has designated certain military regions for the most rapid modernization and training. According to a 22 July 1999 Guangzhou Yangcheng Wanbao article, the Guangzhou MRAF has conducted advanced training with all of the PLAAF's branches. The PLA apparently chose to highlight these types of activities in the Guangzhou MR as a warning to Taiwan. This article appeared shortly after Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui announced his "state-to-state" theory on 9 July.

Reportedly, all of the Su-27 and J-8II fighter pilots have met the requirements for all-weather flights and for flying the lead plane of a four?aircraft formation; the B-6 bomber unit has had excellent results in long?range bombing raids; the Il-76 and Y-8 transport unit has notably enhanced its long-range air transport and combat capability; and the SAM, AAA, and radar units enhanced their air defense net. (62) The article further detailed the specific types of training the fighter and bomber units conducted.

The fighter units successfully conducted tactical drills, including over-the-horizon air combat, multi-target attack, electronic countermeasure warfare, and offshore live ammunition firing. The bomber unit conducted training for the first time involving multi-wave, multi-target, all-weather, long-range, live ammunition bombing. Fully loaded with bombs, cells with multiple aircraft [probably eight aircraft] took off before dawn and flew over half of China to conduct timely and accurate bombing at an unidentified range in northwest China [probably the Gobi Desert training center]. From the desert range, they then flew to an island off the southeast coast to attack targets there. Upon completion of their bomb runs, they returned home in a rain storm, landing after dusk. (63)

The Guangzhou report provided additional details about the PLAAF's airborne, SAM, and AAA training as follows:

For the first time, the Guangzhou MRAF transport unit conducted a six-hour training flight in complicated weather conditions late at night. The aircraft also conducted airborne exercises in an unfamiliar highland cold zone without ground command, ground marks, and weather information. The SAM unit became combat capable in less than one year after receiving new [unidentified] equipment in 1998. In June 1999, the fully-armed SAM unit deployed by vehicle to the Gobi Desert training center in northwest China. The exercise involved multiple goals, including dismantling, leaving, advancing, and launching, as well as food, shelter, management, and storage. While at the training range, the unit employed its new missiles to attack low-altitude, close-range targets in an electronic warfare environment for the first time, and hit every target. (64)