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The statements above most likely describe the PLAAF's "Blue Army" aggressor units. (47) According to several Jiefangjun Bao articles and interviews with PLA and non-Chinese air force officials, the PLAAF has established an aggressor unit at its Flight Test and Training Center at Cangzhou to simulate offensive and defensive operations against the "Red Army." (48) An April 1997 Jiefangjun Bao article reported that,

The Blue Army aggressor unit is equipped with advanced equipment and flown by special-grade and first-grade pilots. This unit has fought numerous air battles with every PLAAF combat aircraft unit, in order to help improve the PLAAF's high?tech combat effectiveness and improve their knowledge of tactics. The specialized unit has emerged as a strong enemy force in simulated air battles, which has led the PLAAF to make numerous changes in its tactical training. In light of China's training situation, the specialized unit has launched no-notice preemptive strikes under real combat conditions. (49)

The air tactics concepts that the Cangzhou training center has developed against the aggressor unit are reportedly now being moved to the unit level, where several units have begun to turn these concepts into live?fire exercises. According to the April 1997 Jiefangjun Bao article, the PLAAF has obtained some initial results in important combat study areas, such as maneuverable combat, air attack, fighting for air supremacy, night attack, and defense. As a result of this training, the PLAAF has adopted a new training syllabus characterized by adaptability to combat situations under future high-tech conditions.

According to various interviews, similar aggressor units have been established in each of the seven military regions. The aggressor aircraft engage in exercises with local units, employing dissimilar aircraft air intercepts utilizing evasive maneuvers. (50) Although interviews indicated that the aggressor unit consists primarily of J-7 and J-8 interceptors and does not have any Su-27s assigned as of yet, this situation may have changed. A recent news article from Hong Kong described an exercise where,

Four Blue Army Su-27s, simulating Taiwan Air Force F-16s, flew from an undisclosed airfield in North China [probably Cangzhou] and conducted air-to-ground attacks against enemy targets. The report noted that the aggressor Su-27s flew a total of 1,600 kilometers, with two SU-27s conducting strikes on a Red Army missile position, a command post, and two radar positions. The Su-27s also destroyed eighteen J-7s parked on the airfield. The remaining two Su-27s flew cover for the other two aircraft and shot down several J-7s in air-to-air combat. (51)

If the aggressor squadron now has Su-27s permanently assigned, this is a significant step forward in tactical training for the PLAAF. (52) The article also points out, however, the J-7s weaknesses in conducting their air defense mission. Whereas the Su-27s radar system and AAMs are capable of shooting down aircraft beyond-visual-range (BVR) in a head-on aerial engagement, the J-7s and older J-8s do not have either capability. The J-7s and J-8s must be within visual range and do not have a head-on intercept capability.

As a result of this more aggressive training program, PLAAF pilots have intensified their training under different weather conditions, at lower altitudes, and, most significantly, over water. (53) They have also practiced rapid deployment to permanent and auxiliary airfields. The PLAAF has also improved its navigation capabilities. There is a density of radio navigation aids (TACAN for the J-7 and J-8 and RSBN for the Su-27) available within China. In addition, the Chinese have indicated that they have retrofitted some of their aircraft with global positioning systems (GPS). Furthermore, the Su-27 and some J-8s have an inertial navigation system (INS) and can use their radar to navigate using islands and coastlines. (54)

In conjunction with these operational changes during the 1990s, the Air Force has had to adjust its logistics, including spare parts acquisition, storage, and distribution, and maintenance practices to meet these new challenges. These adjustments include computerizing individual logistics and maintenance operations, and then networking the computers within the unit and among different units at the same and higher levels. It has also meant establishing small logistics and maintenance teams capable of deploying by rail or air at a moments notice to accompany the unit's aircraft deployment.

On several occasions, many PLAAF units have formed offensive and defensive exercise teams with Navy, Army, and Air Force AAA, radar, and SAM troops to conduct exercises modeled on future warfare. One Xinhua article stated that the PLAAF has generally considered flying low-altitude bombing raids over the ocean as dangerous, since the water and sky look almost the same to the pilot. According to the article, pilots have overcome this difficulty and have now flown large bomber groups less than 100 meters above the sea, hitting all the intended targets. These pilots are now experimenting with new tactics, such as flying close to strategic points at sea, launching surgical air strikes against enemy troops, waging offensive air campaigns, conducting over-the-horizon air combat, and imposing air and sea blockades. (55) These types of missions are new for the PLAAF, since the PLA Naval air force previously was responsible for support to the Navy and over water intercepts of hostile targets.