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Flankers Under the Dragon's Wings

A Timeline of Events

by Crobato

1990	June 14. First contract for 24 aircraft signed, 18 single seaters and four dual seaters. The cost for the SK is approximately $32 million while the UBK is about $35 million. Between 50 to 65 percent of the deal may be dealt with barter currency.

1991

SU-27SK specs defined and set at KnAAPO, while SU-27UBK specs defined and set at IAPO. The radar is a new variant of the N001 Myech, called N001E. Paper specs include a maximum search range of 240km, a target engagement range of 80-100km, with 40km at pursuit. 10 targets are tracked while in TWS (Track While Scan) mode. While there is talk about the radar being “export downgraded”, there seems to be no evidence of such. It only appears that previous quotations for the N001's performance is overly optimistic, and the N001E’s figures are more or less closer to the real world performance. Both radars appear exactly the same with the main exception that the N001E has an accurate bombing aid adjusted for bombs similar to MK-82 Rockeyes in the Chinese inventory, as well as Chinese rocket pods, in contrast to Russian rockets and bombs. The N001E may have been subjected to other bug and reliability fixes as well. Various equipment includes RLPK-27 HUD, OEPS-27 opto-electronic system, and RNA-10 navigation system. Landing gear strengthened for an increase to 6,400kg payload. No built in ECM and the first order of aircraft did not include any ECM pods. Missile orders include R-73E, R-27R/T, and R-27ER/ET.

1992	June. Delivery of first batch, 8 SU-27SKs and 4 SU-27UBKs. PLAAF pilots enter 18 month intensive training course. Many of these pilots appear taken from J-8II and J-7 regiments, and the Russians noted their distrust on using radar.

1992

November. Delivery of 12 SU-27SKs, plus two complementary SU-27UBKs for pilot and technician training (No. 25 and 26.) In addition to No. 25 and 26, No.1, 2, 3 and 4 are UBKs. These early deals were paid in barter, such as clothes and tinned goods, which according to RAND, represented about 65% of the total value.. Or if based on a bilateral agreement, deals were conducted with 50% on A50 currency, where this currency is can only be used to purchase Chinese goods. There is criticism about a said requirement that planes and engines must be returned to Russia for overhauls, but it appears to be an interim requirement, as China lacked the facilities to perform such during that time, and in the quality standards required. Maintenance and overhauls will be conducted on Chinese soil when the proper infrastructure is built. The whole maintenance scheme, while sounding austere, needs to be noted that the two Sukhoi factories, IAPO and KnAAPO, are located in the Russian Far East, and actually are much closer to China than they are to Moscow.

1995

22 SU-27 aircraft delivered, 18 SU-27SKs, and 4 SU-27UBK two seaters. There are two complementary aircraft, marked No. 49 and No. 50. This makes a total of 50 aircraft in the first two batches, confirmed by photograph of SU-27SK PLAAF serial number No. 49 and No. 50. One report says a number of these aircraft may have Zhuk-27 radar for testing purposes. Unlike the first order, it now appears the second batch includes Sorbtsya ECM pods. These pods can be retrofitted on the first batch of fighters.

1996

December 6. License to manufacture signed. Numbers allegedly range from 150 to 300, with 200 the most popularly quoted number. The cost of the license was said to be $2.5 billion, of which $600 million was for knocked down kits, technical documentation and training. According Jane’s and Chinese website reports, this was said to be the SU-27 -SMK variant. However, production turned out to be the basic -SK variant, although Chinese websites and internet posters continue to refer to the license as -SMK.. It may have been possible that China bought the SU-27 license at the SMK level for technological headroom for upgrades in the future. Provisions of this license include 70% maximum local content, 30% minimum Russian content. Engines license is not granted and have to be procured from Russia. No second export is not allowed. Any changes in the specification or improvements must be notified to the Sukhoi bureau including both new build and existing aircraft. If production numbers are not attained, China can exercise an option for Russia to build the equivalent SU-27s. China will set up maintenance facilities for the engines and planes, where as previously it had to send the planes or engines to Russia for overhaul. Knocked down kits were to be initially supplied by KnAAPO, of which the number was later reported to be 50 or 80. Pressing concerns with the Taiwan issue meant that production rates per year would be raised later, with an objective of attaining an optimistic 40 planes a year.

1996	SU-27SMK specs include 8,000kg payload, 12 hard points, two hard points for external fuel tanks, retractable midair refueling probe, Zhuk-27 multirole radar, R-77 and PGM support.

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