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By Dec 8, the 14th KMT Corps surrendered to the PLA and left the only the KMT 18th Corps to hold the perimeter. In a stubborn and heroic defense, the KMT 18th Corps put everyone on the line and fought until their ammunition ran out. By Dec 15, after their third break out attempt failed, the battle was over. The KMT reinforcement, the KMT Sixth army, was still 20 miles to the southeast. The Communists used light infantry to trap the Nationalists, while the tank and artillery went for the kill. The battle was a good example of the People's War, as the local population and militias supported the advancing light Communist infantry with intelligence and food. In addition, there were the extraordinary Communist effort at mobilizing upward of 2 million peasants in four provinces to provide logical support for the troops, and it was directed by Deng Xiaoping, now a veteran party organizer of forty-five.

The acquisition of improved weapons and artillery revealed the need for the PLA to have further training in conventional operations. Captured KMT soldiers were persuaded or forced to teach the communists not only the technical features of crew-served weapons, but also how to use them efficiently in combat. The destruction of the KMT 18th Army and the siege of TianJin showed that passion and enthusiasm of the PLA were no longer adequate substitutes for firepower and technical knowledge. A frontal attack or a firm defensive position required well coordinated support fire such as TOT (time on target) artillery concentrations, the preplanned massing of artillery to kill, blind, deafen, or stun a relatively limited number of enemy troops.